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1 INTRODUCTION 
In 1994, Bolivia, one of the poorest countries in Latin America with an 
important percentage of indigenous people, started a decentralisation process 
that transferred responsibilities and resources to local governments: the 
municipalities. Nowadays, municipalities constitute important actors within the 
development process of Bolivia since they are in charge of the provision of 
public services and of strengthening the local economy. Social expenditure in 
Bolivia has been prioritized due to its effects over human and social 
development. 
In Bolivia, municipalities spend 14.4% of the total national expenditure 
and 16.2% of the total social expenditure. Municipalities are rapidly growing in 
importance mostly because of the large additional funds that they started to 
receive since 2005 as consequence of the tax reform in oil sector. Besides, 
some municipalities have been changing Mayor often using a recall procedure 
(censorship vote) which has harmed their management capacity. Based on 
those problems some positions have arisen, claiming that municipalities are not 
strong enough for receiving additional money since their institutional capacity 
is poor. However, others claim that even with their problems, municipalities 
constitute an important mechanism to bring local and regional authorities the 
capacity of solving problems related to the needs of the people, but at the same 
time as a way to strength legal authority, legitimacy and sovereignty of the 
State. 
Moreover, since 2005 not only political parties can run for elections but 
also citizens and indigenous groups, this has changed the political dynamics at 
the municipal level. It has increased the participation of different political 
groups and added more pluralism to the political system. This pluralism can 
prompt political fragmentation or support political competition that later on 
may affect decisions about prioritisation of social expenditure. Additionally, in 
1997 a gender quota system was introduced, which increased participation of 
women in national political system as well as in municipalities. More women 
are now in municipal councils facing discrimination and other problems but on 
the other hand they are also changing the priorities in municipalities relocating 
resources towards social expenditure. 
It is a fact that those changes in political participation are been reflected in 
the composition of municipal councils and in the social expenditure of 
municipalities. Subsequently, it becomes important to understand how 
composition of municipal councils might affect the prioritisation of social 
expenditure and the capacity of municipalities for spending money in social 
services. 
Regarding this, the objective of this paper is to analyze how composition 
in municipal council (political party and gender composition) can influence 
municipal social expenditure. One way of direct influence is by defining the 
priorities; this will be reflected in the amount of money that each municipality 
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spends in social expenditure as a proportion of total expenses (percentage of 
social expenditure). That shows the priority that each Mayor, municipal council 
and the civil society gives to social expenditure. Those priorities are set up in 
the annual municipal plan which determines the percentage of social 
expenditure to be spent. 
The other way that municipal council influences social expenditure is 
through the decision of changing the Mayor (censorship vote). This may harm 
the management capacity of the municipality to spend more money in social 
expenditure (per capita social expenditure), this capacity can be measured by 
per capita social expenditure. 
General studies about public expenditure have focused in the analysis of 
two kinds of determinants: The first group pays more attention to the role that 
government plays during periods when risk increases (Rodrick, 1996; Shelton, 
2007); the effect of population size and social fragmentation (Alesina and 
Spolaore, 1997; Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998); the effect of ethnic fragmentation 
(Alesina, 2003; Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Easterly and Levine 1997); 
income level (Shelton, 2007); income inequality (Meltzer and Richard, 1981) 
among others. The second group pay more attention to political rights, 
institutions of government and others aspects related to the behaviour of 
elected officials.  In this group are included theories such as rent seeking 
approach (Beniers and Dur, 2007:30); interest groups theory (Kimenyi, 
1989:339-40); the presence of lobbies (Besley and Coate, 2001); local elites 
(Chattophadyay and Duflo, 2004); faction models (Persico, Rodriguez and 
Silverman, 2007); among others and more recently political competition 
(Alesina ,1998; Boyne, 1998; Persico, Rodriguez and Silverman 2007); and 
political culture (Beniers and Dur (2007). 
Precisely the focus of this paper lays on the second group of studies. As 
starting point, I am going to estimate the effect of changing a Mayor in per 
capita social expenditure. Afterwards, I am going to show how the spread of 
votes among political parties (political fragmentation) will increase the 
probability of changing a Mayor. This result will be used to solve a simultaneity 
problem that exists between per capita social expenditure and the probability 
of changing a Mayor. This problem emerges because the change of a Mayor 
may cause a lower per capita expenditure, whilst a lower per capita expenditure 
may increase the pressures for changing a Mayor as well. This problem is 
solved using political fragmentation as an instrumental variable for probability 
of changing a Mayor. I will prove that political fragmentation do increase 
pressures for changing Mayor, and when that occurs per capita social 
expenditure will be lower. However, the effect is smaller when the simultaneity 
problem is solved. 
Furthermore, I will analyze how political party composition may affect 
priorities of social expenditure (percentage of social expenditure), by estimating 
how the power that the Ruler party has in the municipal council (percentage of 
councillors) leads to more or less percentage of social expenditure in a certain 
municipality. A weak Ruler party shows more fragmentation of the political 
council and leads to a smaller percentage of social expenditure due to the 
incentives among politicians in order to behave opportunistically. More 
concentration of power hold in the Ruler’s party hands but with some degree 
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Indicators Bolivia Latin America & Caribbean countries
World position according to Human Development 
Index (HDI) * 115 -
Human Development Index (HDI) * 0.692 0.795
Poverty level measured by local poverty line ** 60.6 39.8
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) *** 65.5 72.9
Iliteracy rate (%) ** 11.7 9.5
Net enrollment ratio in primary education (%) ** 95.2 94.9
GDP US$ Billions *** 11.2 2,945
GDP per capita (PPP US$) *** 1,033 7,964
GDP per capita (US$ Current) 2006 (*) 1,059 4,347
Population (millions) *** 9.3 559.9
Population growth rate (%) *** 1.8 1.3
of political competition gives the serenity for concentrating in municipal 
management. This is reflected in an increase of percentage of social 
expenditure. However, too much power concentrated by the Ruler increases 
the influence of factional groups and the incentives to shift expenditure 
towards targeted groups; as a consequence, the percentage of social 
expenditure will decrease. 
Finally, I will estimate how participation of women in municipal council 
affects preferences and priorities in the definition of social expenditure in 
municipalities. Participation of women in municipal council does affect 
priorities in municipalities and this increases the percentage of social 
expenditure spent by municipalities. 
This paper is organized in six chapters. The second one explains the 
context of municipalities in Bolivia. Besides how they are organized politically 
and institutionally, and it shows important some political features about them. 
The third one contains a discussion about the determinants of social 
expenditure, theories about political behaviour, political competition and 
culture. That chapter ends up building a theoretical explanation about the 
interaction among political behaviour, preferences and social expenditure. The 
fourth chapter describes the methodology that it was used to prove the 
assumptions of this research. The fifth chapter contains the analysis of the data 
y provide measurable support for arriving to the conclusions that are showed 
in the sixth chapter. 
TABLE 1 
Economic and social indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elaborated based on Cepal (2006) and Wold Bank databases in 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20535285~menuPK:
1192694~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html 
Note:  * (2004), ** (2005) and *** (2006). 
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2  MUNICIPALITIES IN BOLIVIA 
2.1 Socio-economic situation 
Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Bolivia’s poverty and income levels are far behind the average of the region. 
However the social indicators tell a different story as Bolivia has made some 
progress and the country’s social indicator are near the average of the region 
(Table 1). Bolivia is constituted by a central government, 9 regional 
governments and 327 municipalities.1 
Bolivia’s economy is based mostly on gas resources, services and industry 
sector. It is often argued that the current system does not promote linkages 
between productive actors, and does not create employment or distributes 
incomes. The democratic system reflects the economical and social changes 
which have occurred in the past few years, as regional, ethnic groups, social 
movements and partisan pluralism have been integrated in the political system. 
Bolivia has always been a multicultural country, with 35 indigenous groups, 
however only recently this condition was accepted openly (PNUD, 2007:120). 
During the last years, the political process in Bolivia has been 
characterized by permanent social conflicts at the national, regional and 
municipal levels. At the national level the conflicts have resulted in the 
replacement of three presidents during the period of 2002 and 2005. The last 
election took place in December 2005 and Evo Morales Ayma, the coca 
farmers’ leader, won the election with more than 54% of the votes, and 
assumed the presidency in January 2006 as the first indigenous president of 
Bolivia. The same year nine governors of the regions were elected for the first 
time.  It is now acknowledged that regional and indigenous autonomies can be 
important to bring local and regional authorities the capacity to address 
peoples’ needs, but also to strength legal authority, legitimacy and sovereignty 
of the State (PNUD, 2007). 
2.2 Decentralization process 
Decentralization started in 1994, year in which the Law called “Popular 
Participation – (PP)” which gave more responsibilities and resources to 
municipalities was implemented2. Before the implementation of this Law, only 
24 out of 311 municipalities were receiving resources to invest in their own 
necessities (FES-ILDIS, 2004). Nevertheless, through that process the national 
government has relocated 20% of the national tax revenues towards 
municipalities in order to address their local necessities, based on the number 
of people who lives in each municipality. The national government has also 
                                                 
1 It includes ministries, universities and other decentralized institutions under direct 
tuition of Central Government (national enterprises and other institutions). 
2 During the implementation of the Law there were 311 province sections legally 
constituted which were denominated municipalities through Law 1551. (FES-ILDIS, 
USAID, 2004:9) 
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transferred the property of education, health, sports, local roads and watering 
infrastructure to the municipalities which now have the responsibility of 
managing, preserving and renewing them (Law 1551, 2004:1-8). Since then, the 
municipalities have been in charge of developing a local economy and seeking 
human and social development. For the first time elections were carried at the 
municipal level, and local governments became the main unity for sustainable 
development (Riveros, 2004:271). 
Moreover, in 1995 began the administrative decentralization that gave 
regional governments the authority for planning regional development plans 
and coordinating municipal ones in their jurisdiction. They received additional 
revenues for supporting investments in municipalities (Law 1654, 1995). Later 
on, in 1999, the Municipality Law that confirmed municipal competences and 
set new rules for municipal management was implemented (Riveros, 2004:292). 
This process was strengthened in 2000 when the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund approved Bolivia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP) and Bolivia was allowed to receive the debt relief offered 
through HIPC II (Highly Poor Indebted Country) initiative (ISS, 2003). This 
allowed the country to reallocate resources that were being used to pay external 
debt towards the funding of social expenditure such as education, health and 
productive infrastructure until 2015 (Law 2235, 2001). Most of those resources 
were transferred to the municipalities according to the number of poor people 
living in each municipality. Ever since, the municipalities have become 
important actors for development process because they have more 
responsibilities and resources to plan, coordinate and implement public policies 
related to the provision of social services and to strengthen local economy. 
The decentralization process has been an attempt to improve the access of 
the whole population to public goods. There is no doubt that the provision of 
social services has improved, at least in terms of distribution of resources. 
However this process has caused that, some municipalities, especially the 
smallest and poorest ones, have not had enough resources to fulfil the basic 
necessities of their population. As municipalities have become important actors 
for the development process, it is important to understand how they work and 
how they accomplish their tasks with respect to the provision of social 
services. 
2.3 Institutional organization of the municipalities 
Bolivia is organized in Central, regional and municipal governments. In this 
scheme each level is in charge of planning development programs at their 
respective level, coordinating plans with the lower levels and assuring that the 
programs are consistent with the priorities of the National Plan (Figure 1). The 
planning processes at the municipal level are carried out with the participation 
of three actors: the Mayor (executive), the municipal council (legislative) and 
some civil society organisations (social control). Those actors define the 
municipal plan (“Plan de Desarrollo Municipal” - PDM) through a 
participatory method. This plan has to include the provision of public goods 
such as education, health, community roads, among others but also has to 
strengthen the local economy (Law 1551, 1994). 
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FIGURE 1 
Institutional organization in Bolivia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elaborated based on Law 1551 (1994). 
 
2.4 Municipal responsibilities and funding sources 
The main responsibilities of the municipalities in Bolivia are: to build, renew 
and repair education, health and basic services infrastructure. They are also in 
charge of school breakfast programs and other educational and health 
programs which look for the improvement of the services. As far as the 
education is concerned, the municipalities’ responsibilities include primary, 
secondary and technical education but not tertiary (universities). Moreover, 
they are responsible for the maintenance of the local and secondary roads, as 
well as, the collection of municipal taxes and patents. In relation to economic 
development they can support production projects and others programs 
related to social assistance, human development and environmental programs 
(Law 1551, 1994; Law 2028, 1999). 
In order to accomplish their responsibilities, the municipalities receive 
transfers from the national government but they also use resources from the 
collection of local taxes (own resources) and loans, transfers and credits from 
international sources. National transfers include resources from Popular 
Participation, HIPC and oil taxes. Transfers from PP represent 20% of the 
total national revenues, and they are transferred to municipalities based on 
population criterions. The HIPC resources come from the debt alleviation 
program and municipalities started to receive them since 2001, based on 
poverty and population criterions. Finally, oil taxes revenues are distributed 
among municipalities considering the size of their population. 
As a result, municipal revenues have increased considerably from US$ 62.9 
millions in 1994, to US$ 328.8 millions, in 2000 and US$ 649.8 millions, in 
2006. Those represent 1.1% of GDP in 1994; 3.9% in 2000; and 5.8% in 2006. 
The increase of municipal revenues is explained mainly by the transfer of new 
resources to the municipalities (HIPC) rather than the increase in the national 
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revenues3. Thus, municipal revenues have incrased with respect to the national 
revenues from 3.1% in 1994 to 11.6% in 2000 and to 14.4% in 20064 (Figure 
2). 
FIGURE 2 
National and municipal revenues in US$ millions 
(1994-2006)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elaborated based on Finance Ministry databases and Udape (2007). 
 
 
The resources collected from local taxes in the 9 main capital cities plus El 
Alto (the most populated cities) represent 80% of those revenues. However for 
most municipalities such resources do not represent an important source of 
funding as they depend mainly on national transfers5. Excluding local 
resources, revenues from PP are the main source of funding for municipalities, 
accounting for more than 70% of the transfers in 2005 and for 57% in 2006 
(Figure 3). The last year (2006) the oil revenues have increased significantly 
because of the tax reform in the oil sector6 which was approved in 2005. As a 
result, in 2006 the oil revenues represented approximately 35% of the total 
revenues (US$ 172 millions). Regarding HIPC resources those have been 
losing relative importance since they only accounted for 8.5% of the transfers 
in 2006. Therefore, municipal revenues have been increasing considerably, 
especially because municipalities have been acquiring more responsibilities to 
address basic necessities and to work on local development strategies. 
                                                 
3 This is true for the whole period except for the last two years when national 
revenues increased significantly as a consequence of the increase of oil revenues. 
4 These results were calculated using information available at www.udape.gov.bo and 
Finance Ministry databases. 
5 Except for the 10 cities whose their own resources are the main source of funding. 
6 This process was called by the government nationalization of the oil resources; 
nonetheless it did not mean a real nationalization but changes in taxes structure in oil 
sector and changes in contracts with international oil companies. 
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 FIGURE 3 
Composition of municipal revenues by funding 
sources (1994-2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elaborated based on Finance Ministry databases. 
2.5  Political parties and municipal councils 
Since 1999 the municipal councillors are elected for a period of five years. The 
Mayor is elected directly once his political party obtains the majority of the 
votes (more than 50 per cent). If this does not happen, the election is made 
between the first two more voted candidates. The councillors are elected 
according to the number of votes that each party has (Law 2028, 1999:23). In 
terms of the participation of the political parties, in 1999, 15 political parties 
had representation in municipal councils. The first three parties obtained 67% 
out of the 1.700 councillors in all the country. Since 2004, citizens and 
indigenous groups are allowed to participate in elections. As a result, 195 
political groups (among party, citizens and indigenous groups) had 
representatives in municipal councils. In spite of this large participation of 
political groups, the vote was still concentrated and the four first groups 
obtained 50% of the councillors in all the municipalities in the country7. 
It is important to highlight the following three features: first, citizens and 
indigenous groups obtained 23% of the councillors and are therefore 
becoming an important political force; second, the representatives of the 
majority parties which had majority in 1999 decreased significantly in 2004. 
Nevertheless they are still in the first fourth places. Third, MAS (Movement 
towards Socialism), the political party of the current president of Bolivia 
increased significantly their number of councilors from 5% in 1999 to 25% in 
2004. Hence, the changes in municipal councils show that political preferences 
and views did change considerably when comparing the two terms. These 
changes did influence the priorities inside municipal council, so that they are 
important in the analysis of social expenditure.  
                                                 
7 All the data was elaborated based on Enlared (2007). 
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2.6  Women in municipal councils 
Before 1994 a large number of women were in charge of municipalities, in part 
because those institutions did not have any clear role or resources to support 
public policies. When municipalities started to become an important unit for 
development process, with resources and responsibilities, men displaced 
women from the municipalities8. ‘In the past, when the municipalities were less 
powerful, women could work there as a form of social service for the 
community. However when the municipalities began to receive resources, men 
began to see the importance of municipalities for the community. The 
involvement of women was then contested: mamita9 go back to the kitchen!’10. 
Therefore, the number of women dropped dramatically and in 1996 only 128 
women (7%) were councillors out of 1700 in all the country. 
In 1997, in response to international pressures to promote women’s 
participation in politics, Bolivia introduced a gender quota system that 
committed political parties to put in their list of candidates at least 30% of 
women for participating in elections. In 1999, the number of women in 
municipal councils increased to 256 councillors (15%) twice the number of 
1996, and to 339 in 2004, (18.8%). How can this change switch priorities at 
municipal level? ‘Women have more predilections for social investment. This 
could be because they do not care about their popularity for the next election, 
maybe because of their political inexperience11’ 
Therefore, if women have different preferences for social investment, it is 
possible that the changes in gender composition in a municipal council would 
lead to changes in the priorities in the expenditure. 
2.7 Censorship vote 
A Mayor can be removed from his/her office if he/she looses the confidence 
of the municipal council. However a Mayor cannot be removed in the first and 
in the last year of his/her term. The procedure for changing Mayor is called 
censorship vote12, and it can be done if three fifths of the councillors decide to 
apply it (Law 2028, 1999:23). 
This procedure was created to solve the conflicts at local level. In the past 
the conflicts with municipal executives were sent to the National Senate or the 
Judiciary system and most of the times they were not solved13. The censorship 
vote then constituted an alternative in order to avoid long and ineffective 
processes. However, during 1995 and 1999 the application of censorship vote 
was a negative experience in some municipalities. In some cases, the Mayor 
                                                 
8 Personal communication with Norma Duran and Diego Ayo (Annex I). 
9 Mamita is a word that it is used as synonym of mother, wife or woman but in a sweet 
way. 
10 Personal communication with Diego Ayo (Annex I) 
11 Personal communication with Norma Duran (Annex I) 
12 In Spanish voto constructivo de censura 
13 By the time the process was known by the Senate, Mayor had ended up his term. 
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was changed every year and in other extreme cases more than once in a year14. 
During that period 58 municipalities removed their Mayors (Lujan, 2004:172). 
In the period between 2000 and 2004, 71 Mayors out of 314 were withdrawn 
or forced to resign (65 were withdrawn), and between 2005 and 2007, 54 
Mayors out of 327 (Enlared, 2007). 
Some positions argue that the recall procedure would affect considerably 
the management capacity of municipalities for providing public services. If this 
is true, it could be better to avoid that process because of the negative 
consequences for expenditure capacity. 
3 SOCIAL EXPENDITURE AND POLITICS 
3.1 Social expenditure and research objectives 
Municipalities have become important actors for the development process in 
Bolivia. Their main responsibilities can be summarized in two points: first to 
provide public goods and second, to support local economic development 
projects. The provision of public goods is important for the reduction of 
poverty since it has significant effects over human and social development. 
The literature discusses how investments in human capital can promote social 
development and lead to significant economic growth. it is not necessary go 
into details here because it is not the objective of this research. Nonetheless, 
evidence of several studies proved that social expenditure does constitute 
investments in human capital. Such investments do have a strong relationship 
with growth, productivity and the increase of capabilities (see Psacharopoulos 
and Woodhall, 1985; Romer, 1994; Sen, 1999 among others). 
Moreover, since 2005 the political dynamics at the municipal level has 
changed considerably as political parties can run for elections as well as citizens 
and indigenous groups. It has increased the participation of different political 
groups and created a pluralist political system. This pluralism can prompt 
political fragmentation or support political competition that later on may affect 
decisions about prioritisation of social expenditure. Additionally, in 1997, a 
gender quota system was introduced, which increased participation of women 
in national political system as well as in municipalities. More women are now in 
municipal councils facing discrimination and other problems but on the other 
hand they are also changing the priorities in municipalities relocating resources 
towards social expenditure. 
It is a fact that those changes in political participation are reflected in the 
composition of municipal councils and in the social expenditure of 
municipalities. Subsequently, it becomes important to understand how 
composition of municipal councils might affect the prioritisation of social 
expenditure and the capacity of municipalities for spending money in social 
services. 
                                                 
14 At the beginning there was no regulation for the application of censorship vote, so 
that it could be applied at any moment during the year and more than once a year. 
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Accordingly, the objective of this paper is to analyze how composition in 
municipal council (political party and gender composition) can influence 
municipal social expenditure. One way of direct influence is through the 
definition of priorities (C Figure 4). This will be reflected in the amount of 
money that each municipality allocate to social expenditure as a proportion of 
total expenses (percentage of social expenditure). This reflects the priority that 
each Mayor, municipal council and the civil society gives to social expenditure. 
Those priorities are set up in the annual municipal plan which determines the 
percentage of social expenditure to be spent. 
The other way in which the municipal council influences social 
expenditure is through the decision of changing the Mayor (B Figure 4). This 
may harm the management capacity of the municipality to spend more money 
in social expenditure (per capita social expenditure). That can be measured by 
per capita social expenditure (A Figure 4). 
FIGURE 4 
Analytical scheme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elaborated based on Law 1551 (1994). 
3.2 Definition of social expenditure 
In this section it is developed briefly two definitions of social expenditure. In 
Adema (2005:7) social expenditure is defined as15: 
The provision by public and private institutions of benefits to, and financial 
contributions targeted at, households and individuals in order to provide support 
during circumstances which adversely affect their welfare, provided that the 
provision of the benefits and financial contributions constitutes neither a direct 
payment for a particular good or service nor an individual contract or transfer. 
Social benefits include cash benefits (e.g. pensions, maternity payments, social 
                                                 
15 This is the definition that OECD accepts. 
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assistance), social services (e.g. childcare, care for the elderly and disabled) and 
tax breaks with a social purpose (e.g. tax expenditures towards families with 
children, or favourable tax treatment of contributions to private health. Two 
main criteria have to be simultaneously satisfied for an expenditure item to be 
classified as social. First, the benefits have to be intended to address one or more 
social purposes. Second, programmes regulating the provision of benefits have to 
involve either a) inter-personal redistribution, or b) compulsory participation. 
On the other hand, Martínez and Espíndola (2007) claim that social 
expenditure is ‘the amount of money for funding social plans, programs and 
projects. Its main objective is to spring up a positive impact in a social 
problem, without differentiating the functions of the administrative entity or 
sector which spend the money (health, education, nutrition, social security, 
social assistance, work, housing, water and sanitation), neither the funding 
sources (public, private donation or external donation) nor the destiny of the 
resources (current and capital expenditure)’. 
The first definition is related with the concept of pro-poor expenditure16 
since it considers only those expenditures that support individuals in positions 
in which their welfare is affected adversely (i.e. poverty). As a consequence, it 
fails to consider the spending which poor people do not receive. As Mosley 
(2006) said ‘OECD concept of social expenditure register the net social 
expenditure’ (i.e. pro-poor expenditure). 
Under this definition expenditures from pension funds and tertiary 
education expenditures (universities) are not considered pro poor because they 
do not contribute to the direct reduction of poverty (World Bank, 2004:48). 
Unlike the first one, the second definition includes all the public goods and 
services. 
However, in the case of municipalities no matter which concept is being 
used, both include all the responsibilities that municipalities have, since they do 
not spent money in tertiary education neither in pension funds. 
3.3 Determinants of social expenditure 
The literature about the determinants of government expenditure includes 
authors who consider that political issues play a secondary role for policy 
choices and authors who assert that their role is important (Mulligan, Gil and 
Sala-i-Martin, 2004). 
In the first group, some studies focused on geographic and economic 
variables as determinants for size of the government. For instance, Rodrik 
(1996) shows that an open economy leads to a bigger government (i.e. larger 
expenditure) because open economies face more external risk. In such 
                                                 
16 This definition tries to measure the expenditure which is targeted to poor people 
(Udape and Unicef, 2006) and it derives from pro-poor growth theories that 
emphasize the idea that ‘promoting growth theories requires a strategy that it is 
deliberately biased in favour of the poor so that the poor benefit proportionally more 
than the rich’ (Kakwani and Pernia, 2000:3). 
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circumstances, government consumption plays an insulating role insofar as the 
government sector is considered a safe sector in terms of employment and 
purchases from the rest of the economy when compared to other sector of 
activities. In the municipal context, this theory helps to explain the role that 
central, regional and municipal government have when there is an increase in 
risk (economic and social crisis). Thus, governments tend to increase 
employment and social expenditure to absorb the negative effects of the shock 
(especially in less developed countries, Shelton, 2007: 5). 
Population size also plays an important role in the determination of public 
expenditure. There is a trade-off between population size and cost of social 
heterogeneity in large populations. A big country has returns of scale when 
providing social services and public goods to a large population. Then, large 
countries have a lower per capita cost of provision services, therefore a smaller 
per capita social expenditure. However, a large country has the added difficulty 
of dealing with the heterogeneity population and the complexity to satisfy their 
different preferences and necessities (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997:1029). 
Although these trade offs exist, Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Alesina and 
Wacziarg (1998) found that the size of country is negatively related with social 
expenditure i.e. the effect of increasing returns prevails over the effect of the 
heterogeneity of the population. 
Moreover, cultural and social diversity would lead to a lower public 
expenditure because of the difficulty of reaching agreements. Some studies 
went deeper into this matter and showed that fragmentation in a society is 
associated negatively with the provision of public goods (Shelton, 2007:6). 
Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) argued that 
expenditure in some public goods are inversely related to ethnic fragmentation. 
More ethnic fragmentation encourages rent-seeking behaviours and it is 
difficult to reach a consensus for the provision of public goods due to the 
diversity of interests. ‘When people persistently identify with a particular group, 
they form potential interest groups that can be manipulated by political leaders, 
who often choose to mobilize some coalition of ethnic groups to the exclusion 
of others’ (Alesina, et al, 2003). 
Furthermore, Meltzer and Richard (1981) say that the size of the 
government depends on the relation of the mean income and the income of 
the decisive voter. Then, if there are high levels of income inequality the mean 
income is higher than the mean income of the decisive voter, this will create 
pressures for redistribution through taxes or expenditure. The critique to 
Meltzer and Richard is that they do not consider the fragmentation that 
income inequality can produce and its effects on the provision of public goods. 
Income inequality can harm the provision of public goods because in an 
environment with fragmentation it is difficult to reach agreements, especially 
during the definition of which public goods have to be prioritised (Alesina, 
Baqir and Easterly, 1999:1259-1261). 
Additionally, income levels determine the size of the government. Studies 
in this matter are related with Wagner’s Law. These studies argue that when a 
State becomes wealthier it turns into a more complex system. The needs for 
public regulatory and protective action also increase. The demand for certain 
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public goods such as education and culture enhancement which are considered 
to be luxury goods also increase with level of income (Shelton, 2007:7). 
Finally, among those studies which claim that political issues play an 
important role in the determination of the public priorities there are some 
which pay more attention to political rights and institutions of government, 
whilst others to aspects related to behaviour of elected officials. 
3.4 Political Behaviour 
Theories about political behaviour explain how behaviours of the politicians 
will have consequences for public choices and then for social expenditure. 
Several theories pertaining to political behaviour claim that policy choices 
are affected either by politicians’ care about their private rents from holding 
office or by their desire to represent the interest of a particular group of voters. 
The rent seeking approach claims that politicians are selfish, thus they look for 
their own interest when they are running for elections (opportunism) (Beniers 
and Dur, 2007:30). In such cases, public policies are determined by the pay that 
politicians can receive because of their acts (in terms of power, money, 
prestige). 
Another approach is the interest groups theory which claims that public 
policy outcomes are the result of the interplay between the concentrated 
interests of groups seeking transfers and the more diffuse interests of groups 
that supply those transfers. Once in power the leaders of the interest groups 
can capture some artificially created rents (rent-seeking) whenever government 
actions creates differentially advantageous position for some people, groups or 
firms. Another possible form of rent seeking behaviour is when leader of the 
interest group transfers more benefits to the members of the group with the 
intention of maintaining his leadership. The problem with this behaviour is 
that it implies a waste of resources because these transfers are not used to 
create value (Kimenyi, 1989:339-40). Therefore, these theories emphasize that 
politicians are selfish and only follow their own interest or the interest of the 
group that they belong. 
Other theories pay attention to the influence that other groups have over 
politicians’ decisions. For instance lobby theories have been used to explain the 
influence that a group can exert over policy makers. Various analyses have 
claimed that lobbying wastes resources and leads to inefficient policy choices 
(Besley and Coate, 2001). Another similar approach is that decentralized 
government is captured by local elite that will determine the allocation of the 
resources following its own interest (Chattophadyay and Duflo, 2004:1416). In 
addition, factional models affirm that the power of delivering resources resides 
largely outside the individual candidate of formal office-holder, and specifically 
in party factions and/or at the higher echelons of the party. Then at election 
time, all faction members have an interest in working to direct the pork to the 
constituents of their faction’s candidate (Persico, Rodriguez and Silverman, 
2007). At municipal level the factional theory explains the influence that the 
national party or central government exert over priorities at municipal level. 
Other theories assert that the behaviour of politicians reflects preferences 
of the electorate. Theories such as citizen candidates’ theory which tries to 
 19
explain how citizen candidates, who can not commit policy choices in advance, 
decide to become candidates for public office (Besley and Coate, 2001:67). 
Once elected the officers try to implement their preferred options; however, 
this model argues that citizens know other citizens’ preferences and can 
influence the final outcome though their choice of whom to elect 
(Chattophadyay and Duflo, 2004:1415). Related to this approach median voter 
theory says that if the decisions are made by representative democracy, then 
the positions near the median preferences will win, so that all public decisions 
can be analyzed in terms of the demand of median voter and his preferences 
(Mathis and Zech, 1989). 
Basley and Coate (2001) combine lobbying theory and citizen-candidate 
approach to see how other groups can influence policies. According to general 
public choice tradition all political actors are self-interested citizens, 
nevertheless Basley and Coate identified some circumstances where lobbying 
has no effect over policy outcomes. 
All the theories explained in this section help to explain and predict the 
behaviour of the politicians and the influence of such behaviour in public 
policies (priorities). However, those models consider that politicians are 
homogenous and do not analyse the competition that can occur among 
political parties. Theories about political competition and political culture take 
into account those aspects in the analysis. 
3.5 Party competition, motivations and political culture 
Party competition implies that ‘governments will not be self perpetuating and 
that elections can, and in some cases do, lead to the replacement of one set of 
officials with another set. The chance, or probability, of turnover is perhaps 
the most salient feature of this system of accountability. Therefore if 
competition works then ruling party has fear of loss the office and seeks to 
produce policies that satisfy the electorate. The struggle for electoral support 
leads rival parties to adopt moderate policies which reflect median voter 
preferences’ (Boyne, 1998:210). This model shows that a self-seeking politician 
will tend to satisfy the median voter preferences because of the fear to lose the 
election. This consequently introduces the idea that political competition can 
change the behaviour of politicians. Consequently, strong competition among 
political parties can be expected to reduce the effect of party ideologies on 
policies, while weak competition reinforces this effect. 
Alesina also discusses how political competition leads to the satisfaction of 
the median voter’s preferences (1998). Politicians are not only selfish but also 
interested in the application of policies preferred by their constituencies. It 
considers that an individual at the end of his political career will not only be 
stimulated to satisfy the median voter preferences but also to follow his own 
preferences. However, since his political party will be interested to continue 
running for elections during long time, the interest of the younger generations 
of politicians will enforce policies which are beneficial for the party in the long 
run which will be closer to the median voter preferences. Therefore, the 
competition of different preferences inside a political party will change average 
preferences for the whole party. 
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Persico, Rodriguez and Silverman (2007) discuss a factional model in 
presence of political competition. In their model, factions are most cohesive 
when the party is relatively insulated from political competition. In such cases 
decisions about public expenditure will tend to go to constituencies whose 
representatives are member of powerful factions, rather than to politically 
swing constituencies. 
Additionally Beniers and Dur (2007) introduced the different motivations 
of politicians, competences and the political culture in the analysis. They define 
political culture as the beliefs of politicians about other politicians’ behaviours 
and motivations. They build a model where politicians are not only purely 
policy-oriented nor purely office-motivated (opportunist). In such 
circumstances, politicians care equally about the preferences of the electorate 
and their own motivations. Policy choices will be determined based on how 
much politicians value those preferences and motivations. When there 
competition within parties, politicians care about the effects of their acts for 
future elections. For instance, if they apply a bad policy and they decide to 
reverse it before the elections, this is a clear signal about the competence of the 
leader. Such actions will affect their possibilities of being re-elected. If all 
politicians are more office-oriented (they care more about payments than the 
quality of the policies) they have an incentive not to reverse the bad policy. As 
a consequence the beliefs about the behaviour of other politicians will 
determine their own behaviour. Therefore political culture is reinforcing the 
political behaviour and it is possible that behaviour of politicians change often 
(multiple equilibrium). 
In a nutshell, politicians have different motivations to run in elections. 
However, the behaviour of politicians will be influenced not only by their own 
motivations, but also by the presence or absence of political competition, by 
the pressures of organized groups and by the political culture among all the 
politicians. 
3.6 The application of the censorship vote and its influence 
over social expenditure 
According to this theory, if there is opportunistic behaviour among councillors 
that situation may increase the pressures for changing Mayor. There will be 
motivation for changing the Mayor when politicians are rent-seeking or 
because of the participation of interest groups (Goldsmith, 1987:472). The 
pressures to change the Mayor will be most likely to arise when the votes are 
spread among several political parties (political fragmentation). The 
fragmentation will reflect different preferences (sometimes extremely different) 
that interact in municipal council. Such interactions make it difficulty to reach 
agreements and in turn that would affect the capacity of spending money in a 
municipality. This is especially strong when politicians believe that the others 
are rent-seeking motivated (political culture). Then, there will be more 
possibilities to behave opportunistically since politicians would be unconfident 
about the behaviour of the other group. Thus, under opportunistic behaviour 
all of them will try to prioritize their own preferences and this would lead to 
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uncoordinated actions of the different groups that will prompt lower output 
and higher bribes (Easterly and Levine, 1997). 
However, if a Mayor is changed because he is corrupt or incompetent 
(rent-seeking approach), this would force next Mayor to show that he will not 
have the same behaviour. The new Mayor will then tend to consider carefully 
the preferences of the electorate (political competition). The effect of changing 
Mayor over capacity of spending social expenditure is not clear, and it will 
depend on the level of political fragmentation, the behaviour of politicians and 
the political culture in a municipality. 
Another explanation comes from Alesina et al (1992) and Alesina and 
Perotti (1993) who assert that change in the head of the government may 
increase the risk of investing, therefore public and private investment may be 
harmed. Nevertheless, the sign of the effect is not clear because while a change 
in the head would lead to an increase in the uncertainty and then to a lower 
public investment, at the same time if the Mayor was corrupt a change would 
been seen as a decrease in the uncertainty and then social expenditure would 
increase (Alesina, et al, 1992:5). 
3.7 Party composition in municipal councils 
Political competition is important for defining public choices. The most 
straightforward measure of competition is the percentage of total council seats 
held by the ruling party (Boyne, 1998:207). Councils with small majorities will 
moderate their ideological preferences, whilst councils with large majorities will 
be free from this constraint. Then, let’s analyse three possible scenarios: The 
first one when Ruler party is weak in terms of number of councillors. The 
second when there is competition among political parties, that means ruler 
party has relatively majority but enough opposition for moderating its 
ideological preferences (Boyle, 1998). And the third one, when ruler party has 
large majority and there is no political competition. 
FIGURE 5 
Political composition of municipal council and percentage 
of social expenditure 
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In the first case, there is a high level of fragmentation and politicians will 
tend to behave opportunistically (Beniers and Dur, 2007). That means 
politicians will behave in the way that they can obtain either rents, prestige 
among others benefits. The ruler party is more willing to accept alliances with 
parties with different motivations and preferences. Then, it will be more likely 
to behave opportunistically since politicians would be unconfident about the 
behaviour of the other group. Thus, under opportunistic behaviour all of them 
will try to prioritize their own preferences and this would lead to 
uncoordinated actions of the different groups that will prompt lower output 
and higher bribes (Easterly and Levine, 1997). In Figure 5 this is represented in 
left part of the curve.  
FIGURE 6 
Analytical scheme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the second scenario, the municipal council is not fragmented, or at least 
the winning party has enough power to be elected on its own or through the 
formation of alliances with parties with similar preferences.17 Even if 
politicians have different motivations, that means they are rent-seeking or 
policy motivated, the competition among political parties will lead to consider 
the preferences of the electorate when public choices are set (Alesina, 1998 and 
Boyne, 1998). This does not mean that preferences can not be manipulated or 
that government can not choose which part of the plan will implement, but at 
least it means that the fear of loosing the power will template partisan and 
personal preferences. In Figure 6 it is the section of political competition, 
when social expenditure reaches its maximum level. In general it is assumed 
that expenditure in social expenditure does not benefit a particular group so 
that it will tend to reflect preferences of the society for better conditions 
(Boyne, 1998; Beniers and Dur, 2007). 
                                                 
17 This is true because winning party can choose their alliances since its participation 
in municipal council permit some manoeuvrability. 
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Finally, the last scenario depicts a situation in which the ruler party does 
not need to make alliances because it has large majority in the municipal 
council. In this case political competition does not play any role. However, 
influence of the parties becomes important as well as motivations of 
politicians, since it is expected that strong competition among political parties 
can reduce the effect of party ideologies on policies, whilst weak competition 
reinforces this effect (Boyne, 1998). In this case factional models can help to 
explain the behaviour of politicians. Here, party preferences will influence 
priorities that mean that allocation of public expenditure will tend to go to 
constituencies whose representatives are member of powerful actions reducing 
social expenditure and increasing more targeted expenditures (right part of the 
curve, Figure 6). Nonetheless, motivations can play a role, if officials are 
policy-oriented then lobbying (or factional pressures) would not affect the 
preferences (Boasley and Coate, 2001), then it can be expected that behaviour 
will be the same than when exist political competition. 
3.8 Gender composition in municipal councils 
The gender composition in municipal councils has changed after the 
application of the gender quota system strengthening women political 
participation. It is possible to argue that this could lead to change in 
preferences among municipal councils, and therefore change in priorities at 
municipal expenditure. If there is a difference between men and women about 
costs for running in elections both will have different utility functions and then 
different preferences about public choices (Chattophadyay and Duflo, 2004). 
Then, if the number of women councillors increases is logically to assume that 
preferences will move towards aspects that women care about, this prediction 
works in the same way that predictions under Median Voter Model. 
But what is the base to say that men are women have different 
preferences? To answer this first we have to see if there are different cost and 
constraints that men and women face for running in elections. Women face 
more costs and constraints when they decide to run in an election. This is a 
realistic assumption if we consider the double role that women play when they 
decide to run for elections (i.e. mother and councillors at the same time), 
without considering problems of violence and political pressure that they face 
as well18. Therefore, because of the different roles in the society (different 
utility functions) and different costs that they face (constraints) women will 
have different preferences in comparison to men. 
Moreover, in municipal council the average preferences will be pro-male, 
first because men dominate participation in municipal councils, but also 
because the powerful groups (political parties, interest groups, groups that can 
do lobby) are in general dominated by men (Chattophadyay and Duflo, 2004). 
                                                 
18 Some women faced political and family pressure to resign and even physical 
violence. In west part some women were hit and in east part there are other forms of 
pressure. Personal communication: Norma Duran (Annex I). 
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Therefore, the increase in participation of women in municipal councils would 
change preferences towards more pro-female ones, and these would affect 
priorities in municipalities. 
4  METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Analytical scheme 
There are now enough elements to explain i) how changes in political 
composition in municipal council would affect the application of the 
censorship vote (B Figure 5) ii) how the application of that procedure would 
affect the capacity of spending social expenditure (A Figure 5) iii) how changes 
in political party and gender composition would affect the priorities regarding 
social expenditure (C Figure 5). All these dynamics are influenced by external 
pressures from central government and the echelons of political parties. 
4.1 Definition of the variables 
Several works are used per capita social expenditure as a measure of the 
capacity of the municipality for deliver resources to the population (see 
Alesina, Wackziarg, 1998; Alesina Spolaore, 1997 among others). The 
advantage of this measure is that allows to control the size of the population 
and then gives a better measure about how much money each individual is 
receiving. More per capita expenditure will reflect more capacity of 
municipality to cover the necessities of their population. 
Other works like Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) tried to explain how it 
is decided the allocation of resources among several kind of goods. Then they 
decide to use percentage of social expenditure as a measure of the prioritisation 
of public goods. 
Then: 
_ ii
i
sepc se
pop
=  1) Per capita social expenditure 
_ ii
i
seperc se
te
=  2) Percentage of social expenditure 
Where: _ ipc se  is the per capita social expenditure, ise is the total social 
expenditure, ipop is the size of population, _ iperc se is the percentage of social 
expenditure and ite is the total expenditure in a municipality.  
4.2 Estimating the impact of political fragmentation over 
censorship vote and its influence over per capita social 
expenditure 
It was argued that the spread of the votes among political parties in the 
municipal council (fragmentation) may influence indirectly the capacity of the 
municipality of spending money in public services. First, more fragmentation 
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increases the probability of applying recall procedure against the Mayor of a 
municipality, and that will harm per capita social expenditure. The effect of the 
application of censorship vote and the change in the capacity of delivering 
resources to the population (per capita social expenditure) is given by: 
3) 1 2 3_ it it it itpc se mun transfers sizeα α α∆ = + ∆ + +  
4 5it it it itcensorship reg u eα α∆ + + +  
Where: imun  is a matrix of variables which includes all the characteristic of the 
municipalities such as: poverty level (Shelton, 2007:7), income inequality 
(Meltzer and Richard, 1981) and ethnic fragmentation (Easterly and Levine, 
1997) that do not change so much in each municipality. ittransfers∆  captures 
all the transfer that municipality receives from central government and they 
will vary over year, but not among municipalities because they are transferred 
under fixed criterions (factional pressures). isize  will include a set of dummy 
variables according to number of persons who live in each municipality 
(Alesina and Spolaore, 1997). ireg  is matrix with all the control variables for 
regions and years, and finally the dummy variable censorship that is 1 when 
municipality changed Mayor through recall procedure and 0 otherwise; iu  is 
the unobservable variables and ie  the error term. 
However, per capita social expenditure and the application of censorship 
vote are determined simultaneity (Alesina and Perotti, 1993; Alesina et al, 
1992). That means both variables will affect each other and the normal 
estimation will produce biased results. 
Then: 
4) ( ) 0i icorr censorship e ≠  
To correct this is necessary to use instrumental variables. It will be used 2 
the two steps least squares procedure. The method consists in applying an 
instrument ( ipoliticalfrag eq. 5) that is not correlated with the error term ( ie ) in 
the main equation (eq. 6). And later on, use the estimation of the instrumented 
variable ( _ icensorship est ) and put it in the main regression (eq. 6) 
5) 1 2 3( _ )it it it itprob censorship est mun transfers sizeβ β β∆ = + ∆ + +  
4 5it it it itpoliticalfrag reg u eβ β∆ + + +  
6) 1 2 3_ it it it itpc se mun transfers sizeα α α∆ = + ∆ + +  
4 5_ it it it itcensorship est reg u eα α∆ + + +  
It is used political fragmentation as instrumental variable since it captures 
the spread of the vote in a municipality. If there is more political fragmentation 
(less value in the index) there will be more difficulties to reach agreements and 
the probability of having problems with the Mayor will be higher (Alesina, 
Baqir and Easterly, 1999).  
The definition of political fragmentation is given by: 
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7) 2( _ )i ipolfrag perc coun=∑  
Where: ipoliticalfrag is the index of political fragmentation, and _ iperc coun  is 
the percentage of councillors that each political party has. Notice that when 
there are more political parties with representatives in the municipal council, 
the index will tend to 1, whilst if there are few political parties in the municipal 
council, then the index will tend to 0 (Alesina, 200319). 
The expected value of the coefficient of political fragmentation is negative 
( 4 0β < ) because the index will be higher while there is less political 
fragmentation, and that will be related with more per capita expenditure. 
Later on, the sign of 4 0α <  in equation 6, if that process harm 
management capacity, but as it was discussed in chapter 3, the coefficient can 
be 4 0α > . It will depend on the behaviour of the politicians and the political 
competition that they face. For this part it will be used data from 2000 and 
2004 the initial and the last year of a complete term of government. 
According to theory the expected value of the coefficient of poverty level 
is positive, since a since a wealthier State requires more complex public 
regulatory and protective action, then as a consequence their expenditure will 
increase with level of income (Shelton, 2007:7). The expected sign of the 
coefficient for income inequality is uncertainty. Since high level of inequality 
can increase pressures for redistribution level of expenditure may be 
incremented (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). On the other hand it can reflect 
social fragmentation that may turn difficult reach agreements and that will 
decrease expenditure (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999). Regarding ethnic 
fragmentation20, the expected sign is positive because more ethnic 
fragmentation encourages rent-seeking behaviour and it is difficult to reach 
consensus for the provision of public goods (Alesina, et al, 2003). 
The coefficient of the population size is expected to be negative. However 
there is a trade off between having increasing returns in the provision of public 
goods and the cost of heterogeneity of the population in large cities (Alesina 
and Spolaore, 1997:1029). Besides, it will be considered all the transfers that 
government gives to municipalities in order to consider the factional influences 
that central government will have over municipalities, at least those related to 
the provision of social services. Moreover, they will reflect the way that 
changes in transfers can change municipal expenditure. 
                                                 
19 In Alesina (2003) another version of this index was used. 
20 En Alesina et al, 2003 ethnic fragmentation was defined by: 
21 ( _ )i iethnic perc pob= −∑ . This index will be 1 when there is high level of 
fragmentation. 
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4.3 Estimating the impact of political composition over 
percentage of social expenditure 
For the explanation of the percentage of social expenditure are included the 
same explanatory variables than in equation for per capita social expenditure. 
The literature did difference between priorities and capacities for spending 
money but include the same explanatory variables with similar theoretical 
support. 
8) 1 2 3 4_ _it it it it itperc se mun transfers size perc rulerγ γ γ γ∆ = + ∆ + + ∆ +  
2
5 6_ it it it itperc ruler reg u eγ γ∆ + + +  
But in this case composition of political council will affect preferences and 
it will determine priorities. The concept that is important is the degree of 
political competition that a municipality has. The most straightforward 
measure of competition is the percentage of total council seats held by the 
ruling party (Boyne, 1998:207). The square term is included to test the inverted 
U shape relation that is assumed between political composition and social 
expenditure. (Benies and Dur, 2007). 
Therefore:  
__ ii
i
Nconc rulerperc ruler
totalcounc
=   
Where: _ iperc ruler  is the percentage of councillors that belongs to winning 
party, _ iNconc ruler  is the number of councillors that belongs to winning party 
and itotalcounc the number of total councillors. 
The expected signs of the coefficient are:21 
4 0γ >  
5 0γ <  
4.4 Estimating the impact of gender composition over 
percentage of social expenditure 
Chattophadyay and Duflo (2004) show that man and women face different 
costs and constraints when they decide to run in a election. This is a realistic 
assumption if we consider the double role that women play when they decide 
to run for elections (i.e. mother and councillors at the same time), but also 
violence and political pressure that they face in municipalities. Therefore, 
women will have different preferences in relation of men. 
                                                 
21 See section 3.7 
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As a consequence, the increase of the percentage of women in municipal 
councils would change preferences towards more pro-female, and these would 
affect priorities in municipalities. 
9) 1 2 3_ it it it itperc se mun transfers sizeφ φ φ∆ = + ∆ + +  
4 5_ it it it itperc women reg u eφ φ∆ + + +  
The expected sign of 4 0φ > since more presence of women will lead to 
changes in preferences towards more social expenditure. 
The data for testing changes in political and gender composition will 
consider two terms of government. The information is available for 2000, 2004 
and 2005. However, because of the accuracy of the data, it will be preferred the 
use of the years 2004 and 2005. Nevertheless, in the Annex there were 
calculated all the regressions including the year 2000. The results did not 
change significantly for that it was decided to work with 2004 and 2000. 
FIGURE 7 
Components of social expenditure 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elaborated based on UDAPE, UNICEF (2006). 
 
5 COMPOSITION OF MUNICIPAL COUNCILS AND SOCIAL 
EXPENDITURE 
5.1 Trends of social expenditure in Bolivia 
Social expenditure includes all the current and capital expenditure in health, 
education, housing, basic sanitation and social protection programs. It is 
funding by national transfers (Popular Participation, HIPC, oil resources), own 
resources and external transfers, credits and donations (Figure 7). The national, 
regional and municipal governments as well as decentralized institutions spend 
in social expenditure according to their responsibilities. 
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
US$ Millions 635.76 666.03 644.48 634.67 653.46 702.72
% of total 
expenditure 39.4% 40.2% 38.0% 37.2% 35.7% 34.5%
% of gov. soc.  
expenditure 48.4% 48.1% 47.4% 44.7% 43.9% 43.3%
US$ Millions 378.49 383.53 381.16 417.97 459.07 504.94
% of total 
expenditure 75.8% 70.4% 74.1% 81.0% 79.0% 75.9%
% of gov. soc.  
expenditure 28.8% 27.7% 28.0% 29.4% 30.8% 31.1%
US$ Millions 156.34 178.11 166.82 213.18 263.85 263.05
% of total 
expenditure 51.8% 52.7% 55.3% 58.1% 58.5% 59.6%
% of gov. soc.  
expenditure 11.9% 12.9% 12.3% 15.0% 17.7% 16.2%
Number of 
municipalities 
included
258 216 187 264 308 326
US$ Millions 133.07 140.99 139.17 127.84 90.22 146.33
% of total 
expenditure 100.0% 99.9% 99.9% 99.7% 99.9% 99.8%
% of gov. soc.  
expenditure 10.1% 10.2% 10.2% 9.0% 6.1% 9.0%
US$ Millions 11.18 17.39 28.47 26.62 22.11 6.43
% of total 
expenditure 1.6% 4.0% 18.4% 15.7% 14.3% 15.7%
% of gov. soc.  
expenditure 0.8% 1.3% 2.1% 1.9% 1.5% 0.4%
US$ Millions 1,314.84 1,386.04 1,360.10 1,420.28 1,488.71 1,623.47
% of total 
expenditure 40.3% 44.6% 48.5% 49.2% 47.9% 48.7%
% of gov. soc.  
expenditure 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Total
Municipalities
Central 
Administration
Regional 
governments
Social Security
National 
enterprises
TABLE 2 
 Social expenditure in US$ millions dollars, as a percentage of total 
expenditure, and as percentage of total government social expenditure  
(2000-2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elaborated based on Finance Ministry databases. 
 
 
National social expenditure was increasing almost every year. 
Nevertheless, in 2005 it increased 9%, almost twice the increment then 
previous years. Regarding the municipal social expenditure, it increased 
permanently so that in 2005 it represented 16.2% of the total social 
expenditure in the country22. Unlike regional governments, municipalities have 
changed the priorities of the expenditure towards more social expenditure, and 
in 2005 it was almost 60% of its total expenditure (Table 2). 
                                                 
22 However, part of the increment is driven by the increase in the number of 
municipalities that were considered in the Finance Ministry databases. 
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Total social 
expenditure
Per capita 
expenditure
Percentage of 
Social 
Expenditure
Greater than 90% 132 17,765,107 12.69 55.8%
Between 80% and 90% 89 29,649,343 14.73 62.5%
Between 70% and 80% 63 16,213,001 15.50 50.1%
Between 60% and 70% 30 17,682,581 19.28 46.3%
Less than 60% 13 75,116,010 24.61 49.4%
Total 327 156,426,042 18.56 51.8%
Total social 
expenditure
Per capita 
expenditure
Percentage of 
Social 
Expenditure
Greater than 90% 132 32,337,803 21.90 53.4%
Between 80% and 90% 89 51,338,181 23.05 53.9%
Between 70% and 80% 63 26,063,182 23.03 54.9%
Between 60% and 70% 30 30,438,985 29.00 57.1%
Less than 60% 13 123,548,780 36.98 63.6%
Total 327 263,726,931 28.58 58.5%
Total social 
expenditure
Per capita 
expenditure
Percentage of 
Social 
Expenditure
Greater than 90% 132 30,465,177 20.38 52.2%
Between 80% and 90% 89 56,888,176 24.93 61.9%
Between 70% and 80% 63 25,933,827 22.49 53.2%
Between 60% and 70% 30 26,179,581 24.15 52.3%
Less than 60% 13 123,436,811 36.17 64.3%
Total 327 262,903,572 27.89 59.6%
Poverty level
Poverty level Municipalities
Poverty level Municipalities
2000
2004
2005
Municipalities
TABLE 3 
 Social expenditure in US dollars, per capita social expenditure, and 
percentage of total expenditure by level of poverty in municipality 
(2000, 2004, 2005) 
 
Source: Elaborated based on Finance Ministry databases. 
 
 
Social expenditure is concentrated in large and rich municipalities, because 
they receive more transfers and also they have more resources from local taxes. 
However, per capita social expenditure23 increased considerably because 
municipalities have received more transfers during the last years. Though, it 
seems that bigger and richer municipalities spend more in per capita terms. 
About the percentage of social expenditure, there is no clear relationship 
between this variable and level of poverty. However, in the last years bigger 
cities prioritized social expenditures more than others (Table 3). 
                                                 
23 A measure about how well municipality cover its population’s necessities. 
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Hence, municipalities have increased their importance in the definition of 
public policies; now they have more responsibilities but also more resources. 
Moreover, municipal social expenditure was increasing its participation in the 
total social expenditure. It is likely that this trend will continue increasing due 
to the additional oil resources that municipalities receive. This situation 
prompted a huge debate in Bolivia regarding the role of the municipalities and 
its institutional capacities. The Central Government tried to centralise part of 
the municipal resources claiming that municipalities do not have the capacities 
to ensure the correct use of them. However, it can not be denied that 
municipalities improved their technical capabilities and they became and 
important political actor for developing and implementing policies. 
5.2 Central government, transfers and municipal social 
expenditure 
Municipal social expenditure is determined mainly by the amount of transfers 
that they receive (Figure 8). This happens because most of the municipalities 
do not have revenues from local taxes. Then, central government may 
influence how municipalities have to spend the money. Actually, half of the 
transfers have to be spent considering priorities determined in advance. 
 FIGURE 8 
Municipal revenues and municipal social expenditure 
in US$ millions dollars (2000-2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elaborated based on UDAPE (2007). 
 
 
For instance HIPC resources have to be spent 20% for education, 10% 
for health, and 70% for economic development. Another way that national 
government can influence social expenditure in municipalities is through the 
payment of salaries in health, education and other sectors. Those payments can 
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Poverty Level*
Number of 
municipalities 
(2007)
Change of 
Mayor (2000-
2004)**
Change of 
Mayor (2005-
2007)***
Population
Greater than 90% 132 19.3% 13.6% 1,530,398
Between 80% and 90% 89 24.7% 18.0% 2,390,543
Between 70% and 80% 63 27.0% 14.3% 1,195,266
Between 60% and 70% 30 23.3% 23.3% 1,154,799
Less than 60% 13 15.4% 15.4% 3,556,522
Bolivia 327 22.6% 16.5% 9,827,528
influence municipal expenditure through two channels24: First, if central 
government increases number of teachers this can pressure municipalities to 
spend more in education facilities (books, schools, and others). However, other 
times it can be an obstacle, when central government does not give enough 
teachers to the municipality then municipality will not have any incentive to 
spend money in education. When those payments are done without clear 
criterions and the central government uses them for rewarding some behaviour 
of the municipality, then municipal social expenditure may be influenced. 
During 2007, central government transferred funds to municipalities without 
clear criterions. This may influence the priorities in municipality if Mayors 
consider those transfers as permanents, so that they could change their policies 
or behaviour considering the government’s preferences. Such influence is what 
the factional models try to explain, and it has to be taken into account because 
of the probability to influence spending in municipalities. 
5.3 Censorship vote and municipal social expenditure 
The censorship vote is applied when municipal council does not trust anymore 
in the Mayor. Sometimes that procedure may affect the management of the 
municipality for deliver services to the people (Abdiwelli, 2001). Nonetheless 
in other cases where the Mayor was corrupt or not capable, the change has 
improved the capacity of the municipality to provide services (Alesina, et al, 
1992). 
TABLE 4 
 Percentage of municipalities that removed their Mayors by term 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Elaborated based on Enlared, 2007, Udape, INE ( N.d.), Udape, INE (2002). 
Notes: * Calculated based on domestic poverty line. See details in Udape, INE (N.d.). **  In this period 
there were only 314 municipalities. *** Two municipalities were not considered because they do not 
have measurement for poverty level. 
 
 
                                                 
24 The expenditures in teachers’ salaries were included separately because they 
represent an important part of those transfers considering number of students in a 
municipality 
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Year Population
Mean percentage of 
councillors that belong 
winning party
Number of 
municipalities
Per capita 
social 
expenditure
Percentage 
of social 
expenditure
Political 
fragmentation
2000
No change 6,756,198 45.0% 256 19.13 51.8% 0.36
Change 1,671,592 41.0% 71 16.26 51.9% 0.32
2004
No change 7,416,449 45.0% 256 30.53 59.5% 0.36
Change 1,810,057 41.0% 71 20.60 53.4% 0.32
2005
No change 7,950,448 50.0% 272 29.70 61.1% 0.4
Change 1,215,207 41.0% 54 18.24 50.4% 0.32
In Table 4 we can see the application of the process in two terms. There is 
a slight difference between the poorest municipalities (those above 80%) and 
the richest25 (those below 60%). Nevertheless, the difference becomes 
important for those groups between 60% and 70% level of poverty. Therefore, 
we can not say that there is a strong relationship between the change of a 
Mayor and the level of poverty in a municipality, although for some groups it 
seems to be true. 
In municipalities where Mayor was changed the per capita social 
expenditure was lower. Besides, the last years the difference it seems to be 
larger. Two things have to be highlighted. The first one is that the first years of 
each term (2000 and 2005) a initial lower expenditure is associated with more 
probabilities to have conflict in the following years. The second thing is that 
during 2000 and 2004, one complete term, the difference in per capita social 
expenditure has increased. This could be evidence that the application of the 
recall have affected the capacity of deliver social services. This could happen 
because a lower per capita expenditure may produce tensions that could lead to 
change the Mayor either because people think Mayor is corrupt or not capable, 
but at the same time the application of the procedure will lead to lower social 
expenditure. 
TABLE 5 
Statistics by change of The Mayor (2000, 2004, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elaborated based on Enlared, 2007, Udape, INE ( N.d.), Udape, INE (2002), Finance Ministry. 
 
 
About political composition, in municipalities where Mayor was changed, 
the winning party had in average 41% of the councillors in both terms. In 
other municipalities, this participation is higher 45% in the first period and 
50% in the second one. Even if the differences are not so large, this shows that 
one possibility to avoid that change is having more representatives in the 
council. Looking at political fragmentation, in the first period the difference is 
                                                 
25 In fact, they are not rich they still have huge levels of poverty. However, we could 
say that they are relatively rich comparing to the other groups. 
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not so high, but in the second it increased26. More fragmentation in the council 
is related with more possibility to change the Mayor. The priorities measured 
by percentage of social expenditure are also different among those groups, but 
this may be the reflection of the political fragmentation rather than the 
application of the recall (Table 5) 
FIGURE 9 
Percentage of councillors that belong to the winning 
party by the application of censorship vote (2005-2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elaborated based on Enlared (2007). 
 FIGURE 10 
Political fragmentation and censorship vote 
(2005-2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elaborated based on Enlared (2007). 
 
                                                 
26 This index will tend to 1 when there is only one political party in the council (no 
fragmentation) and to 0 when there are lots of political party with political 
representation (more fragmentation). 
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In municipalities where Mayor was changed the average of representation 
of the wining party is 40% that means they did not have the majority. 
However, in other municipalities the wining party remained in power even with 
less levels of representation (Figure 9). This could be evidence about the 
diversity of motivations that politicians have. In Figure 10, there are some 
municipalities with high degree of fragmentation (index near to 0) but where 
they did not apply the censorship vote. But one thing is clear, in municipalities 
where Mayor was changed the winning party did not have the majority and in 
average they have more political fragmentation. This means that different 
preferences and priorities would increase the probability of changing Mayor. 
5.4 Political composition of municipal council and social 
expenditure 
The party composition in municipal councils did not change much in the last 
two elections, in terms of number of political parties that have representatives 
in each municipality. In most of the municipalities there are three or four 
parties with political representation, showing some degree of political 
competition. However, about 45 municipalities out of 327 have five or more 
political parties which can be considered too much since the maximum 
number of councillors is 11. In about 59 cases there is lack of competition 
since they have one or two political parties in the municipal council (Figure 
11). 
FIGURE 11 
Number of municipalities by party composition of 
municipal councils (2000-2004 and 2005-2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elaborated based on Enlared (2007). 
 
 
Table 6 shows that there is no clear relation between the percentage of 
councillors from the ruler party with per capita social expenditure neither with 
percentage of social expenditure. Actually, the results are mix. For instance, 
when the wining party has less than 30% of representatives, it seems that per 
capita social expenditure and percentage of social expenditure are greater than 
the other groups. 
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Winning party 
participation Population
Numer of 
municipalities
Municipalities 
which applied 
censure
Per capita 
social 
expenditure
Percentage 
of social 
expenditure
Differences in 
per capita 
social 
expenditure 
2004-2000
Differences in 
percentage of 
social 
expenditure 
2004=2000
2000
Less than 30% 2,129,969 51 16 22.67 56.7%
Between 30 and 50% 3,821,717 176 39 15.54 49.2%
Between 50 and 80% 2,137,178 68 15 20.28 50.4%
Greater than 80% 338,926 19 1 15.96 53.3%
2004
Less than 30% 2,237,196 51 16 33.58 61.5% 10.91 4.7%
Between 30 and 50% 4,240,013 176 39 25.88 60.6% 10.34 11.4%
Between 50 and 80% 2,382,157 68 15 30.28 54.6% 10.00 4.2%
Greater than 80% 367,140 19 1 18.39 44.3% 2.43 -9.0%
2005
Less than 30% 2,129,264 36 11 27.42 65.1%
Between 30 and 50% 3,068,899 163 32 21.09 52.0%
Between 50 and 80% 3,739,491 97 11 34.63 63.5%
Greater than 80% 489,168 30 0 21.01 45.0%
TABLE 6 
Percentage of councillors that belong to the winning party  
and basic statistics (2000, 2004, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elaborated based on Enlared, 2007, Udape, INE ( N.d.), Udape, INE (2002), Finance Ministry. 
 
 
Is this evidence that political composition in municipal councils do not 
affect social expenditure? If we see the differences in period 2000-2004, 
between the beginning and the end of the term, the per capita social 
expenditure will increase in the same way in all the municipalities, except when 
winning party has a huge majority. However, the priorities towards more social 
expenditure (percentage of social expenditure) will increase when party have 
enough power to avoid political problems but still need do alliances for 
reaching majority (30%-50%). In municipalities where the Ruler have large 
majority the change of that percentage turns negative. Moreover, when party is 
too weak or have majority but not the total control of the council, social 
expenditure will increase but less than in the intermediate scenario.  
To test this properly we have to compare two terms, this will be done 
further with the appropriate econometric techniques, however so far, we have 
some evidence that political competition matters for determining changes in 
priorities at municipal level, and when the ruler party is so strong priorities 
changes against social expenditure, maybe because they do not need to care 
about preferences of the electors and they can carry out their own agendas. 
5.5 Gender composition of municipal council and priorities 
The gender quotas system assured that more women participate in the Bolivian 
political process. However it is agued that women face a lot of discrimination 
and their capacity to influence policies is limited. ‘There is discrimination 
problem against women. There is a hierarchy where men have the power. 
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Woman participation Population Numer of municipalities
Municipalities 
which applied 
censure
Per capita 
social 
expenditure
Percentage 
of social 
expenditure
Differences in 
per capita 
social 
expenditure 
2004-2000
Differences in 
percentage of 
social 
expenditure 
2004=2000
2000
Less than 20% 2,623,992 145 37 26.69 52.3%
Between 20 and 40% 5,371,274 135 27 40.68 52.0%
Greater than 40% 432,524 34 7 30.76 46.3%
2004
Less than 20% 2,801,175 145 37 41.11 55.1% 14.42 2.8%
Between 20 and 40% 5,951,295 135 27 52.80 59.7% 12.11 7.7%
Greater than 40% 474,036 34 7 44.78 60.3% 14.01 14.0%
2005
Less than 20% 2,417,746 119 23 37.82 53.4%
Between 20 and 40% 6,396,566 153 22 50.28 62.3%
Greater than 40% 612,510 54 9 45.66 49.1%
Women are in charge of things without importance, but men are in charge of 
economical committee where the important decisions are made27’. 
Then, is there any effect in social expenditure because of the change in 
gender composition in municipalities? If they do not have any influence in 
municipal councils, then it does not matter how many women are in municipal 
councils, their preferences will not be considered. 
TABLE 7 
Percentage of women councillors and basic statistics (2000, 2004, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elaborated based on Enlared, 2007, Udape, INE ( N.d.), Udape, INE (2002), Finance Ministry. 
 
 
Table 7 shows that participation of women in politics did not cause any 
effect on those variables related to social expenditure (Table 7). Nonetheless, 
analyzing the difference between 2004 and 2000, clearly more women in 
municipal council are related with bigger changes in percentage of social 
expenditure (changes in priorities). In municipalities with less than 20% of 
women, the change is low (2.8 percentage points), but in municipalities where 
participation is greater than 40% the change is important (14 percentage 
points). 
Even if it is argued that citizens will elect women when population is more 
willing to spend in social expenditure, these results show that the quantity of 
women in municipal council will change preferences in municipalities. 
However, a more accurately comparison will be given by econometric models 
considering two terms in further sections. 
5.6 Political variables and the effect in social expenditure 
Bolivia has 327 municipalities, the financial information is available for 258 in 
2000, but for 2004 includes almost all the municipalities (304) as well as in 
                                                 
27 Personal communication: Diego Ayo (Annex I). 
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2005 (326). There are some municipalities with huge levels of per capita social 
expenditure. The regressions were done without those extremes cases and the 
conclusions did not change at all, although the significance of the variables of 
interest is stronger in all the cases. However, although those extreme cases 
represent around 5 municipalities per year, it was preferred to show the results 
with the whole sample since the conclusions are not affected by this exclusion. 
But most important it will be avoided the increment of bias due to exclusion of 
more municipalities (bias selection). 
The level of poverty in municipalities is about 83% measured by local 
poverty line. Gender participation incremented from 14% to 18%, and the 
mean of the percentage of power that ruling party has increased from 44% to 
48% in the last two terms. 
Table 9 shows the correlation among the variables of interest. For instance 
more poverty level will be related with less per capita expenditure, but more 
prioritization in terms of percentage of social expenditure. But this result is 
highly correlated with cities, that are the biggest and richest among the 
municipalities, therefore there are mix of effects that have to be separated in 
order to obtain the correct correlations. 
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Variable Year 2000 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Per capita SE 314 13.7028 11.3642 0.0000 82.6250
Perc. SE 258 0.5471 0.1696 0.0110 0.9202
Poverty level 314 0.8374 0.1187 0.4300 0.9990
Income inequality 314 0.2535 0.1237 0.0520 0.6310
Ethnic fragmentation 314 0.7504 0.1737 0.5000 1.0000
Perc. Women 314 0.1466 0.1488 0.0000 0.8000
Perc. winning party 314 0.4405 0.1571 0.2000 1.0000
Perc. square winning party 314 0.2187 0.1625 0.0400 1.0000
Political fragmentation 314 0.3508 0.1347 0.1837 1.0000
Transfers PP 327 0.5837 1.9666 0.0000 21.8261
Transfers OR 267 0.5173 3.3628 0.0000 43.3342
Transfers HIPC 327 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Transfers IDH 327 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Transfers education 306 0.3057 0.8494 0.0010 8.6361
Variable Year 2004 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Per capita SE 314 21.2628 13.2986 0.0000 111.4577
Perc. SE 309 0.5218 0.1484 0.0000 0.9404
Poverty level 314 0.8374 0.1187 0.4300 0.9990
Income inequality 314 0.2535 0.1237 0.0520 0.6310
Ethnic fragmentation 314 0.7504 0.1737 0.5000 1.0000
Perc. Women 314 0.1466 0.1488 0.0000 0.8000
Perc. winning party 314 0.4405 0.1571 0.2000 1.0000
Perc. square winning party 314 0.2187 0.1625 0.0400 1.0000
Political fragmentation 314 0.3508 0.1347 0.1837 1.0000
Transfers PP 327 0.6569 2.3541 0.0000 29.4805
Transfers OR 296 0.5635 4.0509 0.0000 48.1917
Transfers HIPC 327 0.1546 0.2734 0.0000 3.6696
Transfers IDH 327 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Transfers education 326 0.3854 1.0501 0.0013 12.0378
Variable Year 2005 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Per capita SE 314 21.1308 14.3070 0.0000 122.4839
Perc. SE 326 0.5202 0.1178 0.1089 0.9044
Poverty level 314 0.8374 0.1187 0.4300 0.9990
Income inequality 314 0.2535 0.1237 0.0520 0.6310
Ethnic fragmentation 314 0.7504 0.1737 0.5000 1.0000
Perc. Women 326 0.1837 0.1490 0.0000 0.6000
Perc. winning party 326 0.4852 0.1720 0.2000 1.0000
Perc. square winning party 326 0.2649 0.1964 0.0400 1.0000
Political fragmentation 326 0.3898 0.1618 0.1837 1.0000
Transfers PP 327 0.7051 2.5186 0.0062 31.5574
Transfers OR 325 0.4573 3.1686 0.0000 42.9877
Transfers HIPC 327 0.1195 0.2082 0.0019 2.8353
Transfers IDH 327 0.1015 0.2706 0.0007 2.5769
Transfers education 307 0.4109 1.0866 0.0013 12.1336
TABLE 8 
Basic statistics (2000, 2004, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elaborated based on Enlared, 2007, Udape, INE ( N.d.), Udape, INE (2002), Finance Ministry. 
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Per capita SE Perc. SE Poverty level Income inequality
Ethnic 
fragmentation Perc. Women
Perc. winning 
party
Perc. square 
winning party
Per capita SE 1
Perc. SE 0.4591 1
Poverty level -0.1801 0.0149 1
Income inequality -0.1081 0.0474 0.8494 1
Ethnic fragmentation 0.1125 0.0164 0.1529 0.2903 1
Perc. Women 0.0644 0.0752 -0.2015 -0.1508 0.1032 1
Perc. winning party 0.1004 0.0214 -0.069 0.022 0.1811 0.3785 1
Perc. square winning 0.0844 0.0045 -0.0631 0.0174 0.1669 0.3532 0.9733 1
Political fragmentation 0.0865 0.0188 -0.0424 0.0273 0.1754 0.3608 0.9444 0.9661
Transfers PP 0.1377 0.0672 -0.3412 -0.1805 -0.0512 0.1245 0.0154 0.0171
Transfers OR 0.1534 0.0639 -0.3354 -0.1767 -0.0326 0.1197 -0.0028 -0.0019
Transfers HIPC 0.1652 0.0401 -0.1359 -0.0454 -0.0096 0.0662 0.0625 0.064
Transfers IDH 0.1514 0.0474 -0.2303 -0.1424 0.0077 0.1176 0.076 0.0722
Capital City + El Alto 0.1876 0.0273 -0.3634 -0.2085 -0.0355 0.1774 0.0693 0.0718
Transfers education 0.1382 0.0603 -0.3529 -0.2006 -0.0689 0.1325 0.026 0.0282
Political 
fragmentation
Transfers 
PP Transfers OR Transfers HIPC Transfers IDH
Capital City + 
El Alto
Transfers 
education
Political fragmentation 1
Transfers PP -0.0015 1
Transfers OR -0.0129 0.9299 1
Transfers HIPC 0.0402 0.6655 0.4998 1
Transfers IDH 0.0563 0.5247 0.4031 0.4489 1
Capital City + El Alto 0.0515 0.719 0.6357 0.5111 0.4819 1
Transfers education 0.0031 0.9847 0.8798 0.7265 0.5235 0.7595 1
TABLE 9 
Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elaborated based on Enlared, 2007, Udape, INE ( N.d.), Udape, INE (2002), Finance Ministry. 
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5.6.1 The effect of censorship vote in social expenditure 
In this section it will be tested the effect of applying censorship vote over the 
capacity that municipality has for delivering social expenditure (per capita 
social expenditure). In Table 10, applying simple OLS and adding each time a 
number of control variables, the results are quiet stable. It has been added all 
the main variables that theories about social expenditure consider important 
for explaining that expenditure. Then, it was included poverty level, a measure 
of income inequality, a measure of ethnic fragmentation, size of the 
population, transfers that government gives to municipalities, separately 
expenditure in teachers’ salaries (transfers education) because those are given 
considering student size criterion, the own revenues, regional control variables 
and a Dummy variable to measure the application of the censorship vote 
(recall procedure). 
In column 1, the results show that less poverty is related with more per 
capita expenditure. This is related with Wagner’s Law that claims a wealthier 
municipality will need more complex and new services; as a consequence the 
level of social expenditure per capita will increase (Shelton, 2007:7). Income 
inequality is related positively with social expenditure, and it seems that 
inequality is pressuring for redistribution as it was argued by Meltzer and 
Richard (1981), more than prompting social fragmentation as Alesina, Baqir 
and Easterly asserted (1999:1259-1261). 
Ethnic fragmentation starts having a positive relation with per capita social 
expenditure, however when more control variables were added, it became 
insignificant but with the expected sign. Once controlled by other regional and 
transfers variables ethnic fragmentation becomes negative, that means more 
ethnic fragmentation will complicate to reach agreements and this will harm 
per capita social expenditure (Alesina, et al, 2003). 
Transfer resources are included to consider the factional influences that 
central government will have over municipalities, at least those related to the 
provision of social services. They will also reflect the way that changes in 
transfers change municipal expenditure. Some of the transfers are related 
positively with more social expenditure and others negatively with it. This may 
be the reflection of the criterions to distribute those resources, for example 
revenues from Popular Participation (PP) that are distributed based on 
population size are negatively related with social expenditure. Then, this 
variable maybe is capturing that characteristic, and that is why the variables 
that measure size of the population are not significant when they are controlled 
at the same time with population size. Remember that bigger cities will have 
increasing returns of scale in the provision of social goods, therefore bigger 
cities would spend les per capita resources (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997:1029). 
However all the transfers become insignificant when we add regional controls 
that capture in a better way the characteristics that municipalities have. 
The dummy variable for city and the one for own revenues are large and 
reflect some characteristics of the big cities like more institutional capacity for 
spending and the facility to obtain credits and loans from other sources to 
support their expenditure. 
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OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4)
Poverty level -40.2358*** -29.7370** -18.0477 -7.7727
  (11.9545)   (13.2825)   (13.5876)   (14.7947)
Income inequality 26.5902** 13.8923 8.2658 6.1828
  (11.8017)   (12.4026)   (12.3503)   (16.5020)
Ethnic fragmentation 7.6883* 7.4401 7.4705 -4.9126
  (4.4515)   (4.6926)   (4.6233)   (5.8797)
Censorship vote -4.3129** -3.7658** -3.6479** -4.7249***
  (1.7437)   (1.8174)   (1.7992)   (1.8208)
Transfers PP -4.2974* -5.1583** -0.5777
  (2.2036)   (2.1994)   (4.0873)
Own revenues 2.0397** 2.1542** 2.0408**
  (0.9629)   (0.9507)   (1.0078)
Transfers HIPC 17.2478** 12.367 19.8612**
  (8.1058)   (8.3072)   (9.9789)
City =1 24.7583*** 28.1056***
  (6.4242)   (7.0378)
Population between 5000 
and 15000
-1.0276 -0.2589
  (2.0091)   (2.1264)
Population between 15000 
and 50000
1.1814 1.0494
  (2.2664)   (2.4605)
Population < 50000 -1.0646 -0.8671
  (4.6924)   (4.8201)
La Paz =1 -8.3485***
  (3.1050)
Cbba =1 -0.8571
  (3.0230)
Oruro =1 -5.0996
  (3.5781)
Potosi =1 -5.1659
  (3.2045)
Tarija =1 9.9445**
  (5.0310)
Santa Cruz =1 0.4532
  (3.0662)
Beni =1 0.4259
  (4.7930)
Pando =1 6.6324
  (6.2357)
Transfers education -11.7228
  (8.2850)
Constant 43.4222*** 37.9010*** 30.1981*** 33.9643***
  (8.8028)   (9.9007)   (10.2507)   (10.9431)
Observations 314 283 283 282
R-squared 0.0693 0.087 0.1385 0.2431
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TABLE 10 
Regressions of per capita social expenditure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The variable of interest, in this case the application of the censorship vote 
will affect significantly the level of per capita social expenditure. When a Mayor 
is changed through this process municipality will tend to spend US$ 4.7 less 
than if they would not apply that process (column four). This result is highly 
significant. This could be explained because a change of the Mayor has 
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consequences in municipal management harming municipal projects, but also 
when this process is applied there are some problems between council and 
Mayor that caused delays in the implementation of plans. Besides, there are 
some simultaneity problems, because when a Mayor is changed there would be 
effects over per capita expenditure, but at the same time it would be that lower 
per capita expenditure will prompt pressures for changing Mayor. 
For solving this problem it will be used the method of Instrumental 
Variables. The variable political fragmentation affects the application of the 
censorship vote. If there is more political fragmentation there will be more 
difficulties to reach agreements and the probability of having problems with 
the Mayor will be higher (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999). Thus, that variable 
can be used to solve the simultaneity problem. 
Table 11 shows the changes in the probability of changing Mayors when 
political fragmentation changes. It is clear that political fragmentation affects 
the probability of changing Mayor. Less value in the Index (more 
fragmentation) is related with an increase in the probability of applying the 
recall process, therefore, a more fragmented council will mean the interaction 
of different preferences that can increase the difficulty of reaching agreements. 
But at the same time from political competition theories it is possible to say in 
fragmented municipal councils there is a tendency to have an opportunistic 
behaviour. Then, it is more likely that politicians in order to remain in power 
try to share management with other politicians even which those with different 
preferences. This would harm the management and this will increase the 
probabilities of changing Mayor because voters will assume that it is because of 
the lack of capabilities of the Mayor. As a conclusion fragmentation of 
municipal council do affect probabilities of changing Mayor. 
However, simultaneity problem is not the only one. There are some 
unobservable characteristics that would affect the level of per capita 
expenditure. Those characteristics can be institutional capacities that are not 
observables and those for sure will influence the level of expenditure. Others 
like the presence of lobby or elite groups that exert pressures are not 
observables either as well as the political culture migration, and others 
demographic and geographic conditions that could explain the variation in per 
capita social expenditure, as well. Since there are evidence that some 
unobservable characteristics like geographic conditions will not vary over time, 
but among observations, and that others will vary among municipalities but 
not over time, it is possible that the best model is random effect model, 
however this will be tested in order to identify the most accurately procedure.  
The results are in Table 12. The coefficients of the application of 
censorship vote are smaller when it is corrected by IV. Something that grabs 
the attention is that size of the coefficient decreases from US$ 3.9 to US$ 1.5 
when IV is used. In both cases those are significant. This means that the effect 
of censorship vote considering simultaneity will be related with a decrease in 
US$ 1.5 per capita social expenditure. This smaller effect could be explained by 
the fact that in some municipalities the Mayor was corrupt or not capable to 
increase this expenditure, then after the change municipalities started to 
increase that expenditure. 
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Probit Random Effect
Years of schooling -0.1735**
  (0.0879)
Poverty level -2.0895
  (1.4244)
Income inequality -1.2687
  (1.5931)
Ethnic fragmentation -0.4624
  (0.5629)
Political fragmentation -2.3756***
  (0.6495)
Transfers PP -0.0173
  (0.5531)
Own revenues -0.1985
  (0.2011)
Transfers HIPC -0.7968
  (1.2962)
Transfers IDH 0.427
  (0.8843)
City =1 0.7301
  (0.8590)
Population between 5000 and 15000 0.2518
  (0.2064)
Population between 15000 and 50000 0.4116*
  (0.2376)
Population < 50000 0.2718
  (0.5103)
La Paz =1 -0.0573
  (0.2913)
Cbba =1 0.8550***
  (0.2817)
Oruro =1 0.4136
  (0.3465)
Potosi =1 0.6518**
  (0.3137)
Tarija =1 0.2829
  (0.4534)
Santa Cruz =1 0.3979
  (0.3190)
Beni =1 -0.0767
  (0.4881)
Pando =1 -5.9148
  (7,901.5922)
Transfers education -0.322
  (0.7241)
Population size 0.00001
  (0.00001)
Observations 307
Log likelihood -234.31618
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TABLE 11 
Probit model for the application of censorship vote 
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OLS (1) OLS IV (2) Pooled Data 
(3)
Pooled Data 
IV (4)
Censorship vote -4.7249*** -3.5495 -3.9272** -1.5682**
  (1.8208)   (2.6373)   (1.6315)   (0.7727)
Durwin-Wu-Hausman p 0.280 0.094
Observations 282 225 530 473
R-squared 0.2431 0.2306 0.2118 0.218
Fixed Effects 
(5)
Fixed Effects 
IV (6)
Random 
Effects (7)
Random 
Effects IV (8)
Censorship vote -3.7828 -1.0007 -3.9272** -1.5682**
  (2.5863)   (0.8327)   (1.6315)   (0.7727)
Hausman test p value 0.980 0.335
Durwin-Wu-Hausman p 0.357 0.093
Observations 305 248 305 248
R-squared 0.1357 0.1329
Note: The rest of the variables are included in the regresion but they are not showed here to 
keep simple the explanation, however the complete table is in the Annex
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TABLE 12 
IV procedure, pooled data, fixed and random effects of censorship vote  
on per capita social expenditure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, to change the Mayor does harm per capita social expenditure, 
however, the effect is not so high when we correct by simultaneity using 
political fragmentation as instrumental variable. The results can be summarized 
in: First political fragmentation does affect the probability of changing Mayor, 
and this harm management and the capacity to provide services, and then per 
capita expenditure decreases. 
5.6.2 The effects of changes in the power of ruler party in social 
expenditure 
Political competition changes the way that politicians behave in a municipality, 
and then will determine public choices. The most straightforward measure of 
competition is the percentage of total council seats held by the ruling party 
(Boyne, 1998:207). The square term is included to test the inverted U shape 
relation that is assumed between political composition and social expenditure. 
When the Ruler party have less power and it is weak to continue on power (in 
terms of municipal councillors) there is a high level of fragmentation and 
politicians will tend to behave opportunistically (Beniers and Dur, 2007). That 
means politicians will behave in the way that they can obtain either rents, 
prestige among others benefits. It would be possible that politicians have more 
incentives to behave opportunistically because since it is necessary to have 
majority to be Mayor, winning party can share the power with others. But in a 
fragmented scenario the winning party would be more willing to accept 
alliances with parties with different motivations and preferences. Thus, under 
opportunistic behaviour all of them will try to prioritize their own preferences 
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and this would lead to uncoordinated actions of the different groups that will 
prompt lower output and higher bribes (Easterly and Levine, 1997). 
When municipal council is not fragmented, or at least winning party have 
enough power to be elected by its own or doing alliances with parties that do 
not differ so much about its preferences, there are two possible motivations. 
Either politicians will have an opportunistic behaviour or will be policy 
motivated. If they are policy motivated they will try to apply policies that they 
believe are the correct for the municipality. There will be a high correlation 
between those motivations and the preferences of the population, because as 
Alesina (1998) and Boyne (1998) asserted when there is some kind of 
equilibrium among forces there will be a tendency to consider the preferences 
of the electorate when public choices are set. This makes sense considering 
that municipalities have been strengthening participative planning processes 
with the inclusion of some organization from civil society that would ensure to 
take into account the preferences of the electorate. This does not mean that 
preferences can not be manipulated or that the government can not choose 
which part of the plan will implement, but at least means that if civil 
organizations can control effectively municipalities then the actions of the 
government will reflect their preferences. 
Finally when political party does not need to do alliances because it is 
strong enough in terms of municipal councillors, the political culture will not 
play an important role. However, motivations of politicians will be important. 
Here influence of the party becomes important in the analysis, since it is 
expected that strong competition among political parties can be expected to 
reduce the effect of party ideologies on policies, while weak competition 
reinforces this effect.  Factional models would help us to explain the possible 
behaviour. Here, party preferences will influence priorities that mean that 
allocation of public expenditure will tend to go to constituencies whose 
representatives are member of powerful actions. Nonetheless, motivations can 
play a role, if officials are policy oriented then lobbying (or factional pressures) 
would not affect the preferences (Boasley and Coate, 2001), then it can be 
expected that behaviour will be the same than when exist political competition. 
Those scenarios will be modelled introducing the variable percentage of 
councillors that belongs to ruler party and the square term. The sizes of the 
coefficients are stable when we use two periods of time. The jointly test for 
both variables tells that they are significant at 15% using Random Effects28. 
The Hausman test confirms that Random Effects model is the most efficient 
model. The results are: first if percentage of councillors of the ruling party 
increases in 10 percentage points, the percentage of social expenditure will 
increase in 2.78 percentage points29, but at the same time there will be a 
negative effect measured by the square term that it will be important when the 
percentage of councillors increases very much. That means in a municipality 
                                                 
28 Excluding the extreme they are significant at 10%. 
29 It is used for the explanation the coefficient of the Random Effects model; the 
coefficients of the other models did not differ so much from this one. 
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OLS Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
Percentage of councillors (winning 
party)
0.1924 0.3025** 0.2017 0.2780*
  (0.2576)   (0.1470)   (0.1872)   (0.1420)
Percentage of councillors square 
(winning party)
-0.155 -0.2533* -0.2021 -0.2400*
  (0.2592)   (0.1356)   (0.1756)   (0.1312)
Hausman test p value 0.604
F test for interest variables p value 0.668 0.115 0.511 0.152
Observations 281 586 310 310
R-squared 0.1012 0.0722 0.0167 0.0709
Note: The rest of the variables are included in the regresion but they are not showed here to keep simple the explanation, 
however the complete table is in the Annex
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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with 11 councillors30 if percentage of councillors belonging to ruling party 
changes from 9.1% to 18.2% (from 1 to 2 councillors) percentage of social 
expenditure will change from 2.3% to 4.3% (1.9 percentage points) (Figure 12 
and Figure 13). The change in percentage of social expenditure will decrease 
while ruler is having more councillors. And it starts to turn negative (-0.1 
percentage points) when it pass from 54.5% to 63.6% (from 6 to 7 councillors)  
TABLE 13 
OLS, pooled data, fixed and random effects of percentage of councillors 
belonging to the winning party on percentage of social expenditure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 12 
Percentage of municipal council from winning party and its effects  
on percentage of social expenditure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 According to the population size municipal councils can be 5, 7, 9 or 11. However, this 
results are similar for each kind of municipality. 
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1.9%
1.5%
1.1%
0.7%
0.3%
-1.2%
-1.6%
-0.8%
-0.4%
-0.1%
-3%
0%
3%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
OLS Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
Percentage of councillors (women) 0.0393 0.0904** 0.0419 0.0779**
  (0.0663)   (0.0392)   (0.0479)   (0.0377)
Hausman test p value 0.3714
Observations 281 586 310 310
R-squared 0.0996 0.0735 0.0145 0.0716
Note: The rest of the variables are included in the regresion but they are not showed here to keep simple the explanation, however the 
complete table is in the Annex
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
FIGURE 13 
Changes in percentage of municipal council from winning party and its 
effects on changes in percentage of social expenditure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Those results confirm the fact that political behaviour of the ruler party 
will change according to the power that has in municipal council, and those 
aspects seems to interact with political culture that exists in municipality. 
 
5.6.3 The effects of changes in gender composition in municipal 
council over changes in social expenditure 
Regarding women participation in municipal council, a change in 10 percentage 
points in the participation of women in municipal council will lead to a change 
in 0.7 percentages points in percentage of social expenditure. This result is 
highly significant and Hausman test recommends the use of Random Effects 
models to estimate this effect. 
TABLE 14 
Percentage of women in municipal council on percentage  
of social expenditure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since men and women have different preferences because they face 
different costs and constraints for running in elections (Chattophadyay and 
Duflo, 2004), is logically to assume that more women in municipalities will 
move priorities towards aspects that women care about. This prediction works 
in the same way that Median Voter Model. Besides, in municipal council the 
average preferences will be pro-male, first because men dominate participation 
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in municipal councils, but also because the powerful groups (political parties, 
interest groups, groups that can do lobby) are in general dominated by men. 
Therefore, the increase in participation of women in municipal councils would 
change preferences towards more pro-female ones, and these would affect 
priorities in municipalities towards more prioritization of social expenditure. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
Since the last years, political party and gender composition has changed in 
municipal councils in Bolivia, which leads to changes in preferences about the 
priorities in social expenditures that each municipality has.. Although political 
parties still concentrate the majority of the councillors in the country, the 
participation of citizen and indigenous political groups in elections changed the 
political composition of municipal councils. As result of the elections held in 
2000, for the first time in political party history in Bolivia, citizens and 
indigenous political groups obtained  23% of the total amount of councillors 
of the country. Besides this, the three political parties that owned majority in 
1999, as result of the elections in 2004, lost many of their representatives, 
whilst a political party that until then didn’t played such an important role at 
municipal level as in 1999 it just obtained 5% of the councillors, while in 2004 
it obtained 25% of the representatives.  
Moreover, the gender participation in municipal councils has increased 
since the implementation of the gender quota system in 1997. Therefore, more 
women have been elected in municipalities (18.8%). 
In average, in Bolivia the political fragmentation did not change in 
municipalities, considering the last two political terms, and most of these 
municipalities are working in conditions of relatively political equilibrium. In 
both terms (2000-2004 and 2005-2007) the majority of municipalities (70%) 
had three or four political parties within the municipal council. This guaranteed 
a relatively political competition in municipalities. However, the rest 30% of 
municipalities have either low level of competition (one or two political groups 
are in the council) or to much fragmentation (five or seven political groups). 
These features did not vary among the last two terms of government. 
Additionally, political fragmentation in municipalities does increases the 
probabilities of applying censorship vote (recall procedure) against Mayors and 
such a process harm management capacity to provide social services, so that 
per capita social expenditure decreases. The more political fragmentation, the 
more probabilities to change Mayors as a more fragmented council has the 
presence of different preferences interacting, which turns more difficult to 
reach the agreements. When a Mayor is changed the per capita social 
expenditure decreases US$. 3.9. However the decrease is smoothed when it is 
taken into account the simultaneity problems between per capita social 
expenditure and censorship vote so that the effect of applying that procedure 
is US$. 1.5, it is less than a half of the first calculated effect. This implies that: a 
lower per capita expenditure causes more probability to change a Mayor, but 
also when a Mayor is changed the per capita social expenditure is lower. If this 
effect is not included, the final results are biased.  
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In addition, changes in the political party composition in municipal 
councils do change the priorities in relation to social expenditure. The change 
of the power that the Ruler party has in the municipal council (percentage of 
councillors) leads to increase or decrease the percentage of social expenditure 
in a certain municipality. 
A weak Ruler party shows more fragmentation of the political council and 
leads to a smaller percentage of social expenditure due to the incentives among 
politicians in order to behave opportunistically. More concentration of power 
hold in the Ruler’s party hands but with some degree of political competition, 
gives the serenity for concentrating in municipal management and this is 
reflected in more percentage of social expenditure. However, too much power 
concentrated by the Ruler party, increases the influence of factional groups and 
the incentives to shift expenditure towards targeted groups; as a consequence, 
the percentage of social expenditure decreases. 
Which means that if the percentage of ruling party changes from 9.1% to 
18.2% (from 1 to 2 councillors out of 11) the percentage of social expenditure 
will change from 2.3% to 4.3% i.e. it will increase 1.9 percentage points. The 
optimal point for supporting social expenditure is reached when power of the 
Ruler is 54.5% (6 councillors out of 11), since additional councillor will 
decrease the percentage of social expenditure. In the extreme case that the 
Ruler party holds all the power which means that it has no political 
competition, the social expenditure will be smaller in 4.2 percentage points in 
relation to the maximun point.   
Finally, more women are now in municipal councils changing the priorities 
in municipalities by relocating resources towards social expenditure. Even if 
they face discrimination and other problems, participation of women in 
municipal council has increased and it affects priorities in municipalities 
towards more social expenditure. Having an additional woman in the 
municipal council will cause a change in percentage of social expenditure about 
0.7 percentage points. Although the effect seems to be small it is related to the 
kind of role that women have in municipal councils, they are more likely to be 
present in human development committee but not in the economical, legal one 
where the big decisions are taken, However, in spite of those problems the 
evidence shows that women do change preferences in allocation of resources 
in municipalities in Bolivia. 
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OLS OLS IV Pooled Data Pooled Data 
IV
Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
IV
Random 
Effects
Random 
Effects IV
Poverty level -7.7727 -1.5015 -3.5434 0.7876 -3.5434 0.7876
  (14.7947)   (18.0078)   (9.9908)   (10.8496)   (9.9908)   (10.8496)
Income inequality 6.1828 5.5978 5.5481 4.5548 5.5481 4.5548
  (16.5020)   (19.5464)   (11.0217)   (11.8992)   (11.0217)   (11.8992)
Ethnic fragmentation -4.9126 -11.1444 -5.9064 -8.8968** -5.9064 -8.8968**
  (5.8797)   (7.0519)   (3.9541)   (4.2883)   (3.9541)   (4.2883)
Censorship vote -4.7249*** -3.5495 -3.9272** -1.5682** -3.7828 -1.0007 -3.9272** -1.5682**
  (1.8208)   (2.6373)   (1.6315)   (0.7727)   (2.5863)   (0.8327)   (1.6315)   (0.7727)
Transfers PP -0.5777 2.5506 -0.2324 0.7017 -1.2318 -0.5119 -0.2324 0.7017
  (4.0873)   (5.0135)   (2.6427)   (2.7992)   (4.1991)   (4.2691)   (2.6427)   (2.7992)
Own revenues 2.0408** 0.9863 1.1051* 0.8521 1.5113 1.2984 1.1051* 0.8521
  (1.0078)   (1.3645)   (0.5786)   (0.6145)   (1.7068)   (1.7313)   (0.5786)   (0.6145)
Transfers HIPC 19.8612** 16.1336 7.1792* 6.9301* 10.1279 9.5573 7.1792* 6.9301*
  (9.9789)   (11.4472)   (3.7057)   (3.8621)   (7.7042)   (7.7492)   (3.7057)   (3.8621)
City =1 28.1056*** 28.8102*** 20.2164*** 20.7009*** 20.2164*** 20.7009***
  (7.0378)   (7.7062)   (4.6353)   (4.7864)   (4.6353)   (4.7864)
Population between -0.2589 -0.2988 0.1399 -0.0742 0.1399 -0.0742
  (2.1264)   (2.8184)   (1.3835)   (1.5023)   (1.3835)   (1.5023)
Population between 1.0494 2.562 2.0592 2.3249 2.0592 2.3249
  (2.4605)   (3.3877)   (1.5312)   (1.6495)   (1.5312)   (1.6495)
Population < 50000 -0.8671 -0.6277 -0.2644 -0.5459 -0.2644 -0.5459
  (4.8201)   (5.5621)   (3.1593)   (3.3556)   (3.1593)   (3.3556)
La Paz =1 -8.3485*** -7.3438** -7.7385*** -7.1064*** -7.7385*** -7.1064***
  (3.1050)   (3.5540)   (2.0368)   (2.1515)   (2.0368)   (2.1515)
Cbba =1 -0.8571 0.543 -3.7415* -3.5070* -3.7415* -3.5070*
  (3.0230)   (3.6169)   (1.9821)   (2.0512)   (1.9821)   (2.0512)
Oruro =1 -5.0996 -3.9862 -7.7474*** -7.7248*** -7.7474*** -7.7248***
  (3.5781)   (4.2298)   (2.3764)   (2.5257)   (2.3764)   (2.5257)
Potosi =1 -5.1659 -2.8658 -5.8119*** -4.7338* -5.8119*** -4.7338*
  (3.2045)   (4.4655)   (2.2175)   (2.5551)   (2.2175)   (2.5551)
Tarija =1 9.9445** 12.7815** 3.3491 4.3164 3.3491 4.3164
  (5.0310)   (5.6100)   (3.2940)   (3.4162)   (3.2940)   (3.4162)
Santa Cruz =1 0.4532 0.8754 -2.3434 -2.2339 -2.3434 -2.2339
  (3.0662)   (3.4379)   (2.0413)   (2.1371)   (2.0413)   (2.1371)
Beni =1 0.4259 2.5756 1.5779 3.2804 1.5779 3.2804
  (4.7930)   (5.7975)   (3.1604)   (3.4331)   (3.1604)   (3.4331)
Pando =1 6.6324 -13.2335 4.0285 -0.0699 4.0285 -0.0699
  (6.2357)   (18.1399)   (3.8410)   (4.6841)   (3.8410)   (4.6841)
Transfers education -11.7228 -14.8894 -5.3486 -6.6912 -9.688 -9.8353 -5.3486 -6.6912
  (8.2850)   (9.7146)   (5.1379)   (5.4436)   (13.3851)   (13.4051)   (5.1379)   (5.4436)
year 2004=1 5.6859*** 3.7137** 5.7519*** 3.9246** 5.6859*** 3.7137**
  (1.1840)   (1.4593)   (1.4129)   (1.5271)   (1.1840)   (1.4593)
Constant 33.9643*** 28.3679** 26.4328*** 24.9719*** 20.0085*** 20.2321*** 26.4328*** 24.9719***
  (10.9431)   (13.1683)   (7.2635)   (7.8646)   (3.5129)   (3.7261)   (7.2635)   (7.8646)
Hausman test p value 0.980 0.335
Durwin-Wu-Hausman p 
value 0.280 0.094 0.357 0.093
Observations 282 225 530 473 305 248 305 248
R-squared 0.2431 0.2306 0.2118 0.218 0.1357 0.1329
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Name Institution Position Date
Iván Arias Consultant Municipal expert, former Vice 
Minister of Popular Participation 
Vice Ministry
August 9th, 2007. La Paz - Bolivia
Adalberto Ticona AMDEPAZ August 10th, 2007. La Paz - Bolivia
Diego Ayo Consultant Municipal expert, former Vice 
Minister of Popular Participation 
Vice Ministry
August 20th, 2007. La Paz - Bolivia
Roque Chavarría Santa Cruz prefecture Member of municipal support 
department
August 21th, 2007. La Paz - Bolivia
Norma Durán AMDECRUZ Executive Director of AMDECRUZ August 21th, 2007. La Paz - Bolivia
Rubens Barbery CEPAD Director August 22th, 2007. La Paz - Bolivia
ANNEX I 
Persona communications from August 8th to 22nd, 2007. La Paz - Bolivia 
 
 
 
ANNEX II-a 
OLS, IV, pooled data, fixed and random effects of censorship vote on per 
capita social expenditure (2000-2004) 
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OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4)
Poverty level -0.2316* -0.1288 -0.0564 -0.0963
  (0.1395)   (0.1516)   (0.1596)   (0.1773)
Income inequality 0.1979 0.1233 0.0811 0.1024
  (0.1367)   (0.1403)   (0.1435)   (0.1970)
Ethnic fragmentation 0.0411 0.0383 0.0445 -0.0132
  (0.0529)   (0.0538)   (0.0542)   (0.0692)
Percentage of councillors (winning party) 0.3822* 0.4254* 0.4350* 0.1924
  (0.2311)   (0.2350)   (0.2369)   (0.2576)
Percentage of councillors square (winning 
party)
-0.4059* -0.4260* -0.4191* -0.155
  (0.2217)   (0.2238)   (0.2268)   (0.2592)
Transfers PP 0.0091 0.0087 0.0926*
  (0.0247)   (0.0253)   (0.0483)
Own revenues -0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0022
  (0.0108)   (0.0109)   (0.0119)
Transfers HIPC -0.033 -0.0797 0.0844
  (0.0909)   (0.0956)   (0.1176)
City =1 0.0112 0.1411*
  (0.0736)   (0.0832)
Population between 5000 and 15000 0.0102 0.0007
  (0.0234)   (0.0249)
Population between 15000 and 50000 0.0345 0.0176
  (0.0265)   (0.0291)
Population < 50000 0.0729 0.0616
  (0.0542)   (0.0572)
La Paz =1 0.0248
  (0.0367)
Cbba =1 0.0351
  (0.0350)
Oruro =1 -0.0144
  (0.0420)
Potosi =1 0.0026
  (0.0378)
Tarija =1 -0.0125
  (0.0598)
Santa Cruz =1 0.0815**
  (0.0361)
Beni =1 0.0649
  (0.0571)
Pando =1 -0.0296
  (0.0788)
Transfers education -0.2374**
  (0.0982)
Constant 0.5551*** 0.4790*** 0.4069*** 0.5186***
  (0.1192)   (0.1291)   (0.1368)   (0.1523)
F test for interest variables p value 0.168 0.164 0.180 0.668
Observations 309 282 282 281
R-squared 0.0262 0.0321 0.0423 0.1012
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
ANNEX II-b 
OLS, IV percentage of councillors belonging to the winning party on 
percentage of social expenditure (2004-2005) 
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OLS Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
Poverty level -0.0963 -0.1108 -0.1174
  (0.1773)   (0.1116)   (0.1245)
Income inequality 0.1024 0.0923 0.0991
  (0.1970)   (0.1235)   (0.1370)
Ethnic fragmentation -0.0132 -0.0204 -0.0219
  (0.0692)   (0.0431)   (0.0482)
Percentage of councillors (winning party) 0.1924 0.3025** 0.2017 0.2780*
  (0.2576)   (0.1470)   (0.1872)   (0.1420)
Percentage of councillors square (winning party) -0.155 -0.2533* -0.2021 -0.2400*
  (0.2592)   (0.1356)   (0.1756)   (0.1312)
Transfers PP 0.0926* 0.0194 0.1166 0.0217
  (0.0483)   (0.0218)   (0.1114)   (0.0219)
Own revenues -0.0022 0.0034 0.0074 0.0028
  (0.0119)   (0.0052)   (0.0124)   (0.0053)
Transfers HIPC 0.0844 0.0705 -0.1131 0.0641
  (0.1176)   (0.0678)   (0.2572)   (0.0708)
Transfers IDH 0.034 -0.06 0.0234
  (0.0427)   (0.0636)   (0.0395)
City =1 0.1411* 0.019 0.0219
  (0.0832)   (0.0536)   (0.0587)
Population between 5000 and 15000 0.0007 0.0072 0.008
  (0.0249)   (0.0153)   (0.0169)
Population between 15000 and 50000 0.0176 0.0085 0.0099
  (0.0291)   (0.0179)   (0.0198)
Population < 50000 0.0616 0.0171 0.0208
  (0.0572)   (0.0374)   (0.0416)
La Paz =1 0.0248 -0.0033 -0.0051
  (0.0367)   (0.0228)   (0.0255)
Cbba =1 0.0351 0.0234 0.0236
  (0.0350)   (0.0225)   (0.0252)
Oruro =1 -0.0144 -0.0155 -0.0158
  (0.0420)   (0.0264)   (0.0296)
Potosi =1 0.0026 -0.0129 -0.012
  (0.0378)   (0.0239)   (0.0266)
Tarija =1 -0.0125 -0.0091 -0.0069
  (0.0598)   (0.0384)   (0.0429)
Santa Cruz =1 0.0815** 0.0563** 0.0562**
  (0.0361)   (0.0231)   (0.0260)
Beni =1 0.0649 0.0326 0.0348
  (0.0571)   (0.0359)   (0.0400)
Pando =1 -0.0296 -0.0369 -0.0315
  (0.0788)   (0.0454)   (0.0497)
Transfers education -0.2374** -0.0676 -0.0813 -0.0691
  (0.0982)   (0.0524)   (0.1553)   (0.0529)
Year 2004=1 0.0089 0.0047 0.0067
  (0.0116)   (0.0110)   (0.0100)
Constant 0.5186*** 0.5077*** 0.4391*** 0.5211***
  (0.1523)   (0.0943)   (0.1638)   (0.1018)
Hausman test p value 0.604
F test for interest variables p value 0.668 0.115 0.511 0.152
Observations 281 586 310 310
R-squared 0.1012 0.0722 0.0167 0.0709
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
ANNEX II-c 
OLS, IV, pooled data, fixed and random effects percentage of councillors 
belonging to the winning party on percentage of social expenditure (2004-
2005) 
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OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4)
Poverty level -0.2286* -0.1326 -0.0715 -0.1143
  (0.1380)   (0.1495)   (0.1565)   (0.1749)
Income inequality 0.2329* 0.159 0.1202 0.1225
  (0.1356)   (0.1394)   (0.1421)   (0.1943)
Ethnic fragmentation 0.0247 0.0277 0.0364 -0.0145
  (0.0521)   (0.0536)   (0.0540)   (0.0690)
Percentage of councillors (women) 0.0595 0.0614 0.0695 0.0393
  (0.0596)   (0.0635)   (0.0643)   (0.0663)
Transfers PP 0.012 0.0125 0.0974**
  (0.0247)   (0.0252)   (0.0485)
Own revenues -0.0022 -0.0018 -0.0033
  (0.0108)   (0.0109)   (0.0119)
Transfers HIPC -0.0451 -0.0914 0.086
  (0.0910)   (0.0954)   (0.1175)
City =1 0.0014 0.1377*
  (0.0742)   (0.0831)
Population between 5000 and 15000 0.017 0.0011
  (0.0229)   (0.0249)
Population between 15000 and 50000 0.0408 0.0173
  (0.0260)   (0.0292)
Population < 50000 0.0743 0.0586
  (0.0539)   (0.0569)
La Paz =1 0.0225
  (0.0366)
Cbba =1 0.0348
  (0.0349)
Oruro =1 -0.0153
  (0.0419)
Potosi =1 0.002
  (0.0377)
Tarija =1 -0.0094
  (0.0595)
Santa Cruz =1 0.0795**
  (0.0366)
Beni =1 0.0653
  (0.0576)
Pando =1 -0.0312
  (0.0735)
Transfers education -0.2448**
  (0.0985)
Constant 0.6269*** 0.5673*** 0.5017*** 0.5762***
  (0.1017)   (0.1116)   (0.1184)   (0.1300)
Observations 309 282 282 281
R-squared 0.0178 0.0225 0.0342 0.0996
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
ANNEX II-d 
OLS, percentage of women councillors on percentage of social expenditure 
(2004-2005) 
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Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
Poverty level 0.0013 -0.0111
  (0.1023)   (0.1162)
Income inequality 0.0123 0.0138
  (0.1128)   (0.1280)
Ethnic fragmentation -0.0252 -0.0221
  (0.0398)   (0.0454)
Percentage of councillors (winning party) 0.2238 0.2433 0.2274
  (0.1392)   (0.1888)   (0.1412)
Percentage of councillors square (winning party) -0.1734 -0.1882 -0.177
  (0.1309)   (0.1752)   (0.1324)
Transfers PP 0.0068 0.0229 0.008
  (0.0214)   (0.0313)   (0.0219)
Own revenues 0.0032 0.0073 0.0031
  (0.0049)   (0.0100)   (0.0051)
Transfers HIPC 0.0529 0.0094 0.051
  (0.0432)   (0.0608)   (0.0412)
Transfers IDH 0.0643* 0.0325 0.0558
  (0.0387)   (0.0419)   (0.0363)
City =1 0.015 0.0148
  (0.0478)   (0.0540)
Population between 5000 and 15000 -0.0049 -0.0039
  (0.0139)   (0.0157)
Population between 15000 and 50000 0.0007 0.0017
  (0.0156)   (0.0176)
Population < 50000 -0.0249 -0.0218
  (0.0330)   (0.0375)
La Paz =1 -0.0024 -0.0043
  (0.0207)   (0.0237)
Cbba =1 0.0121 0.0109
  (0.0203)   (0.0233)
Oruro =1 -0.0490** -0.0503*
  (0.0241)   (0.0275)
Potosi =1 0.0056 0.0042
  (0.0222)   (0.0252)
Tarija =1 -0.0646* -0.0661*
  (0.0341)   (0.0392)
Santa Cruz =1 0.0354* 0.0343
  (0.0210)   (0.0241)
Beni =1 0.0378 0.0348
  (0.0324)   (0.0369)
Pando =1 -0.0691* -0.0713
  (0.0397)   (0.0446)
Transfer education -0.031 -0.0272 -0.0331
  (0.0461)   (0.0955)   (0.0478)
Year 2004=1 -0.0270* -0.0192 -0.0258**
  (0.0139)   (0.0138)   (0.0129)
Year 2005=1 -0.0415*** -0.0290** -0.0385***
  (0.0135)   (0.0133)   (0.0125)
Constant 0.5081*** 0.4679*** 0.5138***
  (0.0863)   (0.0537)   (0.0952)
Hausman test p value 0.013
F test for interest variables p value 0.1755 0.3488 0.1834
Observations 832 311 311
R-squared 0.0638 0.0214
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
ANNEX III-a 
Pooled data, fixed and random effects of percentage of councillors belonging 
to the winning party on percentage of social expenditure (2000-2004-2005) 
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Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
Poverty level -0.0064 -0.0187
  (0.1016)   (0.1156)
Income inequality 0.0295 0.0316
  (0.1117)   (0.1270)
Ethnic fragmentation -0.0267 -0.0237
  (0.0398)   (0.0453)
Percentage of councillors (women) 0.0698* 0.0683 0.0689*
  (0.0358)   (0.0487)   (0.0364)
Transfers PP 0.0062 0.0203 0.0069
  (0.0214)   (0.0312)   (0.0219)
Own revenues 0.0031 0.0086 0.0032
  (0.0048)   (0.0100)   (0.0051)
Transfers HIPC 0.0547 0.0134 0.0521
  (0.0431)   (0.0606)   (0.0412)
Transfers IDH 0.0658* 0.0387 0.0578
  (0.0386)   (0.0418)   (0.0362)
City =1 0.0074 0.0071
  (0.0479)   (0.0541)
Population between 5000 and 15000 -0.0046 -0.0035
  (0.0138)   (0.0157)
Population between 15000 and 50000 0.0013 0.0024
  (0.0156)   (0.0176)
Population < 50000 -0.0264 -0.0231
  (0.0328)   (0.0374)
La Paz =1 -0.0059 -0.0077
  (0.0207)   (0.0237)
Cbba =1 0.0117 0.0105
  (0.0201)   (0.0232)
Oruro =1 -0.0521** -0.0537*
  (0.0240)   (0.0275)
Potosi =1 0.0017 0.0002
  (0.0221)   (0.0251)
Tarija =1 -0.0637* -0.0650*
  (0.0340)   (0.0391)
Santa Cruz =1 0.0305 0.0295
  (0.0212)   (0.0243)
Beni =1 0.0334 0.0308
  (0.0327)   (0.0371)
Pando =1 -0.0684* -0.0703
  (0.0386)   (0.0436)
Transfer education -0.0294 -0.0312 -0.0307
  (0.0460)   (0.0950)   (0.0477)
Year 2004=1 -0.0266* -0.019 -0.0254**
  (0.0139)   (0.0138)   (0.0129)
Year 2005=1 -0.0424*** -0.0302** -0.0395***
  (0.0134)   (0.0133)   (0.0125)
Constant 0.5641*** 0.5264*** 0.5705***
  (0.0747)   (0.0226)   (0.0845)
Hausman test p value 0.0114
Observations 832 311 311
R-squared 0.0642 0.0211
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
ANNEX III-b 
Pooled data, fixed and random effects of percentage of women councillors 
on percentage of social expenditure (2000-2004-2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
